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Introduction
At least since the Great Depression, explaining why there are business
uctuations has been one of the biggest challenges that the science of eco-
nomics has had to face. The hope is that if we could better understand
recessions, then we could also be more successful in overcoming them. This
dissertation consists of three papers that are part of the general endeavor of
economists to understand these uctuations.
The rst paper discusses, for a particular model, whether a result related
to uctuations would still hold if time were modeled as continuous rather than
discrete. The two other papers focus on price stickiness. The second paper
discusses why, after a large devaluation, prices of non-tradables may change
by only a small amount in comparison to the magnitude of the devaluation.
The third paper examines price adjustment in a model in which information
is imperfect and it is costly to change prices.
The Random-Lags Approach: Application to a Microfounded
Model
Aghion et al. (2004), ABB from now on, present an open-economy model
that explains why economies at an intermediate level of nancial development
may be more unstable than either more or less developed economies. It has
been objected that ABBs result holds only if time is modeled as discrete
and vanishes if time is modeled as continuous. The intuition is as follows. In
ABBs model the economy jumps back and forth over a steady state. If time
were modeled as continuous, however, then the economy would go through
the steady state; and once it was at the steady state, it would be stuck
there and uctuations would not occur. I use the approach of Invernizzi and
Medio (1991), IM from now on, to show that ABBs result still holds when
the discrete-time assumption is relaxed.
IM consider that discrete time and continuous time are the two extremes
between which there is a continuum of intermediate cases. They recast this
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time-modeling issue into a heterogeneity issue. IMs insight is that at the
macro level, the assumption that production takes place in discrete time
implies in fact two assumptions: production at the rm level must occur at
discrete intervals and production of all rms must be synchronized. IM accept
the lag assumption at the micro level, which is often realistic, but reject the
synchronization assumption, which is usually unrealistic. In order to get a
model that is not synchronized, they assume that lags are heterogeneous and
random. They show that there is a correspondence between random lags
following a degenerate distribution of variance zero and the discrete-time
model, whereas the continuous-time model corresponds to the case in which
random lags follow an exponential distribution.
I show that ABBs result (an economy at an intermediate level of devel-
opment may be more unstable than either more or less developed economies)
is still valid for many intermediate cases between the discrete-time model
and the continuous-time model.
Small Price Change Response to a Large Devaluation in a Menu-
Cost Model
After a devaluation, one could expect that the price of imported goods
expressed in domestic currency would increase, leading to an increase in the
prices of non-tradables. In an empirical paper based on ve large deval-
uation episodes (in Argentina, Brazil, Korea, Mexico and Thailand), how-
ever, Burstein et al. (2005a) nd a very slow adjustment in the prices of
non-tradable goods and services after large devaluations. Burstein et al.
(2005b) develop a model that can account for this phenomenon. They con-
clude by noting a shortcoming of their paper: in their model the prices of
non-tradables do not change at all, while in reality these prices do change,
albeit by far less than the exchange rate does.
I consider an alternative, simpler model and explore under which condi-
tions moderate menu costs can explain the muted response of the prices of
non-tradables. The key new element in this alternative model is a nominal
friction in wage-setting (generated by menu costs for changing wages). I nd
for example that although my model is based on menu costs, it is able to
deliver not only an absence of response of the prices of non-tradables, but
also a small response. This shows that partial adjustment is compatible with
menu costs being the sole nominal rigidity, even in the case of large devalu-
ations. I also discuss the existence of multiple equilibria and the role of the
central banks credibility.
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Can a Hybrid Sticky-Price and Sticky-Information Model Rec-
oncile Stylized Facts on the Frequency of Individual Price Changes
and on Ination Dynamics?
Theories based on imperfect information rather than on menu costs are
making a comeback. But explaining price stickiness solely on the basis of
imperfect information can be criticized on several counts. One such criticism
is that this implies that every rm changes its prices every quarter (except in
the special and unrealistic case of zero steady-state ination), whereas this
does not match empirical facts on the frequency of individual price changes.
In this paper I build a hybrid model combining the standard model based
on menu costs with the sticky-information model of Mankiw and Reis (2002)
based on imperfect information. Because of menu costs, not all rms will
change their prices each period in the hybrid model. However, the question
arises as to whether the gain in this microeconomic dimension is obtained
at the cost of a loss in the macroeconomic dimension. I show that this need
not be the case. Focusing on an economic environment compatible with the
literature and for which computation is particularly simple, I show that the
gain in the microeconomic dimension does not necessarily imply a loss in the
macroeconomic dimension.
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Part I
The Random-Lags Approach: Application to
a Microfounded Model
Abstract
It is well known that a one-dimensional discrete-time model may
yield endogenous uctuations while this is impossible in a one-dimensional
continuous-time model. Invernizzi and Medio (1991) recast this time-
modeling issue into an aggregation issue. They have proposed a
"random-lags approach" as a way of preserving uctuations while re-
laxing the discrete-time assumption. The present paper applies this
approach to the model of Aghion, Bacchetta and Banerjee (2000), and
shows that their result that economies at an intermediate level of -
nancial development may be prone to economic uctuations continues
to hold when the discrete-time assumption is relaxed.
Keywords: continuous time, discrete time, uctuations, aggrega-
tion.
JEL Classication Number: E32.
I would like to thank my thesis advisor Professor Philippe Bacchetta for useful com-
ments, as well as Je¤rey Nilsen, Alexander Mihailov and the members of my thesis com-
mittee: Professors Harris Dellas, Jean Imbs and Giovanni Favara.
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1 Introduction
One explanation of economic uctuations is based on nancial frictions.
Bernanke and Gertler (1989) have shown that borrowing constraints on rms
can amplify and increase the persistence of temporary shocks. Kiyotaki and
Moore (1997), Aghion, Banerjee, and Piketty (1999) and Azariadis and Smith
(1998) have shown that these constraints can lead to oscillations in the con-
text of a closed economy. Aghion, Bacchetta, Banerjee (2004), ABB from
now on, study the case of a small open economy.
The goal of ABBs paper is to explain why economies at an intermediate
level of development may be more unstable than either more or less developed
economies. They propose a model in which uctuations are more persistent
for intermediate values of the borrowing constraint (which correspond to an
intermediate level of nancial development)1. In order to derive their result,
ABB assume time to be discrete. The problem is that there is no reason
(other than technical simplicity) to make this assumption. The present pa-
per shows that their result still holds when the discrete-time assumption is
relaxed.
In order to prove ABBs result while relaxing the discrete-time assump-
tion, I use the approach of Invernizzi and Medio (1991), IM from now on.
They recast this time-modeling issue into an aggregation issue. IMs insight
is that at the macro level the assumption that production takes place in dis-
crete time implies in fact two assumptions: production at the rm level must
occur at discrete intervals and production of all rms must be synchronized.2
If rms are not synchronized, then at any given date some rms are nishing
their production; in this case, aggregate production might best be seen as
continuous although production is a discrete-time variable at the agent level.
IM accept the lag assumption at the micro level, which is often realistic, but
reject the synchronization assumption, which is usually unrealistic. In order
to build a model that is not synchronized, they assume that lags are hetero-
geneous and random. Thus, the date of production of di¤erent rms cannot
1They also show that in economies at an intermediate level of nancial development full
capital account liberalization may destabilize the economy (while foreign direct investment
does not destabilize it). But I will focus here on their rst result.
2IMs approach is general and applies to any discrete-time model of the form Xt =
f(Xt 1). In specic applications, the terminology "lags" may sometimes seem inappropri-
ate. For example, in the production case, this lag is the exogenously-given time-interval
between two production processes, which may include periods that one may not want to
call "lags", such as the duration required to produce. But for simplicity I will stick to the
lag terminology.
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be synchronized, since their lags are di¤erent. IM show that their model
converges toward the discrete-time model when the dispersion of lags tends
toward zero. Then they show that if the dispersion of lags is small enough,
the endogenous uctuations of the discrete-time model are preserved.3
The present paper applies this approach to ABBs paper and shows not
only that uctuations are preserved, but also that the point of the ABBmodel
(uctuations are greater for economies at an intermediate level of nancial
development) holds while relaxing the discrete-time assumption. The plan
of the paper is as follows: after presenting ABBs Model (x2), I apply IMs
approach to it (x3) and present concluding remarks (x4).
2 A specic one-dimensional, discrete-time ex-
ample: ABBs model
The goal of ABBs paper is to explain why economies at an intermediate
level of nancial development may be more unstable than either more or less
developed economies. I focus here on the simplest version of ABBs model.
It features a small open economy with two types of agents: entrepreneurs
and owners of a local input. Entrepreneurs produce a tradable good which
is both a consumption and a capital good. The price of this tradable good
is taken as given because of the small open economy assumption. The other
input in the production of the tradable good is a local input that is not owned
by entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurs can borrow at an interest rate r  1, which
is exogenous, given the assumption of a small open economy. Entrepreneurs,
however, may not be able to borrow as much as they wish because they are
subject to a borrowing constraint. This borrowing constraint takes the form
of a constant credit-multiplier . Entrepreneurs can borrow up to  times
their wealth. The parameter  captures the level of nancial development.
When  = 0 entrepreneurs cannot borrow, whereas when  =1 there is no
limit to the amount entrepreneurs can borrow.
At time t, after consumption, entrepreneurs have wealth Wt at their dis-
posal. Because of the borrowing constraint they can borrow up to Wt.
If they choose to borrow the maximum amount possible, they will have
(1 + )Wt at their disposal. They buy the quantity zt of local input at price
pt, and use the di¤erence Kt = (1 + )Wt   ptzt as a tradable input. They
3In fact IM do not only show that uctuations still yield: they are mainly interested
in the chaotic properties of these uctuations.
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choose zt in such a way as to maximize their own production. Production is
a function y(Kt; zt) of the tradable and local inputs. In their basic example,
ABB assume that the production function is a Leontief: y = min(Kt
a
; zt).
Entrepreneurs receive an exogenous income e and at the end of the period
repay the principal with interest rWt to the lender. Then, entrepreneurs
consume a fraction  of their wealth (this behavior can be derived from log
utility).
The equilibrium price pt adjusts to set zt equal to the supply of local input
assumed to be a constant z. If z > K
a
(this happens when Wt is so small
that current investment cannot absorb the total supply of the non-tradable
input), then there is excess supply of the non-tradable input and thus its
price is null. If z = K
a
then it can be shown that pt =
(1+)Wt az
z
. The
case z < K
a
cannot exist because it cannot be optimal for the entrepreneurs
to choose a quantity of the costly tradable input in excess of what is useful
given the amount of local input.
Entrepreneurs can also choose not to borrow the maximum amount pos-
sible (they are then not constrained). In this case the return on their invest-
ment is r 1, and their wealth in the next period isWt+1 = (1 )(e+rWt).
The dynamics Wt+1 = f(Wt) of the entrepreneurswealth are therefore
given by:
Wt+1 = (1  )

e+max

min

1 + 
a
  r

Wt; z   rWt

; rWt)

.
Assuming e > 0, 1 > ar, and (1 )r < 1, these dynamics are represented
graphically in Figure 1.
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Figure 1: Dynamics of the entrepreneurswealth
Wt
Wt+1
(1-a)e
az/(1+m) z/r(1+m)
(1-a)[e+z[1-ra/(1+1/m)]]
(1-a)[e+z/(1+m)] (1-a)r
-(1-a)mr
(1-a)((1+m)/a-rm)
The steady state is given by the intersection between this curve and the
diagonal. There are uctuations only if the curve has a negative slope at
the steady state, i.e. if the intersection is on the second segment (and these
uctuations are permanent only if the slope is a negative number lower than
 1). It can be shown that the steady state will be on the rst segment if
 is small enough, and on the third segment if it is large enough. Thus,
uctuations occur (the steady state can be on the second segment) only for
an intermediate level of nancial development (i.e. for intermediate values
of ).
ABB explain the basic mechanism underlying their model as follows. It is
a combination of two forces: on one side, greater investment leads to greater
output and ceteris paribus, higher prots. Higher prots improve creditwor-
thiness and fuel borrowing that leads to greater investment. Capital ows
into the country to nance this boom. At the same time, the boom in invest-
ment increases the demand for the country-specic factor and raises its price
relative to the output good. This rise in input prices leads to lower prots
and therefore, reduced creditworthiness, less borrowing and less investment,
and a fall in aggregate output. Of course, once investment falls all these
forces get reversed and eventually initiate another boom. The reason why
an intermediate level of nancial development is important for this result
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is easy to comprehend: at very high levels of nancial development, most
rmsinvestment is not constrained by cash ow so shocks to cash ow are
irrelevant. On the other hand, at very low levels of nancial development,
rms cannot borrow very much in any case and therefore their response to
cash-ow shocks will be rather muted.
If there are uctuations, one of the two forces described above should
dominate sometimes and the other one should dominate at other times. But
in between there should be a point at which the two forces cancel each other
out. This point would be a steady state. In a single-variable, continuous-time
model governed by a di¤erential equation of degree 1,4 the economy would
be stuck at this steady state and would not uctuate after all. But ABB
assume that time is discrete. In this case the economy may overshoot the
steady state, and then jump back over the steady state and be ready for a
new cycle. It is this discrete-time assumption that I will try to relax.
3 Extension of ABBs model with random
lags
I rst discuss IMs random-lags approach (x3.1) on which my extension of
the ABB model is based, then this extension is presented (x3.2).
3.1 IMs random-lags approach
Consider any variable X and assume that its dynamics in discrete time are
given by:
Xt = f(Xt 1) . (1)
For example, it may be useful to think of X as representing aggregate
production nished at time t.5 The lag is the time required to produce (a
new cycle of production starts right after the preceding is nished). The
discrete-time dynamics equation (1) says that aggregate production nished
at time t is a function of aggregate production nished at time t  1.
4A single-variable, continuous-time model governed by a di¤erential equation of de-
gree n can be regarded as a n-variable, continuous-time model governed by n di¤erential
equations of degree 1.
5When applying this approach to ABB I will choose X=Wealth of the entrepreneurs.
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Instead of the single representative rm implied in equation (1), one may
consider an economy consisting of a large number of rms di¤ering only
by their production lags. Assume that this lag is random, and the density
function  gives its distribution. Then equation (1) can be written as:
Xt =
Z 1
0
 (s)f(Xt s)ds . (2)
Equation (2) indicates that aggregate production nished at time t is
the sum of production processes started in the past. Aggregate production
carried out s periods ago, Xt s, generates total production f(Xt s). Only a
fraction  (s) of this production will, however, be nished at time t. Thus
the production process beginning at time t s will contribute  (s)f(Xt s) to
aggregate production at time t. Notice that if  (s) = 0 for s 6= 1 then lags are
not random anymore, and equation (2) can be simplied to Xt = f(Xt 1).
The strength of the approach proposed by IM is to keep the discrete-time
assumption at the micro level, a realistic assumption, but to dismiss the
assumption of perfect synchronization, which is usually unrealistic.
Assuming that  (s) is a gamma density
 (s) =
1
(n  1)!n
nsn 1e ns , (3)
with expectation 1 and variance 1
n
(where n1; the economic interpretation
of this parameter is presented below), IM show that equation (2) is equivalent
to the following di¤erential equation:
1
n
D + 1
n
X = f(X) , (4)
where D = d
dt
is the time-derivative operator.
Here the parameter n plays a crucial role. If n is innite, then the variance
of the distribution of lags is zero, and equation (4) describes a discrete-time
model.6 If n = 1, then equation (4) describes a single-variable, continuous-
time model governed by a di¤erential equation of degree 1. For intermediate
values of n, equation (4) describes an intermediate case between discrete time
and rst-order continuous time.
n can be interpreted as the number of successive and independent el-
ementary operations needed to complete production, the duration of each
6It can be shown that the di¤erential equation (4) tends toward (1) when n tends
toward innity.
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elementary operation being random and following an exponential distribu-
tion. For comparability, only production processes are considered for which
the whole production process is expected to last one period. If there are n
operations, then each operation is assumed to have an expected duration of
1
n
.7 When n rises, the expected production lag stays the same (1 by construc-
tion), but the dispersion around this expected value decreases. The reason
is that when there are many operations, it is very unlikely that operations
are always short or always long. Thus by the law of large numbers the time
gained on short operations tends to be canceled by the delay of some other,
long operations. At the limit as n!1 the distribution of lags is degenerate
and one obtains the discrete-time model.
n = 1 corresponds to the continuous-time model: in this case equation
(4) is a di¤erential equation of degree 1. n = 1 is the opposite of n = 1
(as the continuous-time model is the opposite of the discrete-time model)
because the distribution of production duration for n = 1 is the opposite
of the distribution of production duration in the discrete-time model in the
following sense: the distribution for n = 1 has the property that production
duration can take any positive value (instead of only one as in the discrete-
time model) and that the probability of a rm nishing production in the
next innitesimal interval of time is completely independent of the time that
has elapsed since production last occurred (instead of being completely de-
termined by the time that has elapsed since production last occurred as in
the discrete-time model).
Values of n between 1 and 1 correspond to intermediate cases between
continuous time and discrete time. IM show that permanent uctuations that
appear in discrete time still remain in intermediate cases close enough to dis-
crete time. Intuitively, if n is large enough, then the standard deviation of
production duration is small enough, and the tendency of production of vari-
ous rms to get out of synchronization is weak enough, such that permanent
uctuations arising in the discrete-time model are not canceled out. Remem-
ber that uctuations arise in the discrete-time model because all entrepre-
neurs can borrow large amounts when they start with large wealth, putting
upward pressure on the price of the non-tradable input, leaving them with
small prots and thus small wealth for the next period. This whole process
collapses if production of various rms are su¢ ciently out of synchronization.
7Then it can be shown that the production duration will follow the gamma distribution
given by equation (3).
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Formally IM show8 that the condition for having a periodical solution is
0 > f 0(X) =   1
cosn(
n
)
, (5)
where X is the steady state of X dened by: X = f(X).
It is easy to derive equation (5) by taking the following linear approx-
imation of equation (4) around the steady state (using f(X)  f(X) + 
X  X f 0(X)): 
1
n
D + 1
n
  f 0(X)
  
X  X = 0 . (6)
The eigenvalues  are given by the solutions of
 
1
n
+ 1
n
= f 0(X). Notice
that for f 0(X) < 0 the eigenvalues with the higher real component are a
complex number (with the imaginary component di¤erent from zero) and its
complex conjugate. Their real component is n
nf 0(X) 1n cos(
n
)  1
o
.
For n = 1, this maximal real component is equal to   f 0(X)  1 , which
is negative. Thus all real components are negative and the system is stable.
For n = 2, this maximal real component is equal to 1 (except if f 0(X) =
1), which is negative. Thus all real components are negative and the system
is stable.
For n > 2, the real component of all eigenvalues is negative and the
system is stable if f 0(X) >   1
cosn(
n
)
, whereas there is at least one dimension
in which the system is unstable if f 0(X) <   1
cosn(
n
)
. If f 0(X) =   1
cosn(
n
)
, it
can be shown that there is a periodical solution.
If n ! 1 , then   1
cosn(
n
)
!  1 and, as usual in discrete-time models,
there are permanent uctuations if the slope of f at the steady state is smaller
than  1.
The following graph (which is plotted for n > 2) shows that 1
cosn(
n
)
is
already close to its horizontal asymptote for small n. This is an indication
that uctuations will still yield even for fairly small n.
8They dont explicitly write this equation, but it is a straightforward implication of
their paper.
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Figure 2: Dependence of the domain of uctuations on the lag
distribution
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3.2 Robustness of ABBs results
I now show that qualitatively ABBs result is still valid for intermediate cases
close enough to a discrete-time model.
Using X  W in equation (4), the dynamics are given by
1
n
D + 1
n
W = f(W ) ,
where
f(W ) = (1  )

e+max

min

1 + 
a
  r

W; z   rW

; rW )

.
How do the properties of the steady state depend on ? First the steady
stateW must be computed. The steady state satises the following equation 
1
n
D + 1
n
W = f(W ), which, since W is constant, reduces to W = f(W ).
Thus, the steady state is the same as in ABBs discrete-time case. Assuming
14
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a is big enough, the steady state will be either on the second or the third
segment. Lets discuss the stability of the steady state. Linearizing around
the steady state yields:
1
n
D + 1
n
  f 0(W )
  
W  W = 0 .
The eigenvalues  are given by the solution of
 
1
n
+ 1
n
= f 0(W ). If the
steady state is on the third segment, then 0 < f 0(W ) < 1 and all eigenvalues
have negative real components. Thus the steady state is stable and there will
be no permanent uctuations. If the steady state is on the second segment,
then f 0(W ) is negative, and there will be permanent uctuations if f 0(W )
is su¢ ciently negative. The di¤erence with respect to the discrete case is
that "su¢ ciently negative" no longer means that f 0(W ) <  1, but that
f 0(W ) <   1
cosn(
n
)
. Thus as long as n>2 the di¤erence from the discrete-
time model is quantitative (how negative f 0(W ) needs to be in order to get
permanent uctuations) rather than qualitative.
The previous argument shows that for n > 2 ABBs result is still valid
(although, as I will show, the set of values of e for which it holds becomes
more restrictive). To illustrate, I now compute the wealth path for several
values of n and  with given parameter values. Figure 3 shows the relevant
graphs.
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Figure 3: Wealth path for various levels of nancial development
and lag distribution
Wealth’s path Horizontal axis: time Vertical axis: wealth
Parameters:r = 1. 02,J = 0. 1,z = 100,e = 1, b = 1. Leontief production: y = minÝ Ka ,zÞ with a = 23
Initial values: WÝ0Þ = 0. 2, and all derivatives are null at t=0
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The last row of Figure 3 shows that when n is innite (i.e. the discrete-
time case) uctuations are permanent for an intermediate value of  (here
 = 5), while the system converges quickly if  is smaller ( = 0) or larger
( = 20). When n = 10 or even n = 4 (which is fairly close to rst-order
continuous time: the standard deviation of the lags is still half what it would
be in the rst-order continuous case), it is still true that the uctuations
are permanent for intermediate values of  only. But this is no longer true
for n = 3: even for the intermediate value  = 5 there are no permanent
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uctuations. It is easy to understand why uctuations cannot be permanent
for n = 3, given our parameters values. Simple algebra shows that for
n > 2, if e
z
< 1 (1 )r1
cosn(n )
+(1 )r there will always be permanent uctuations for
some value of : there will always be a  such that the steady state is on the
second segment and the negative slope is steep enough for uctuations to be
permanent. With our parametrization, however, there will be no such  for
n = 3 since this inequality is not satised ( e
z
= 1
100
and 1 (1 )r1
cos3(3 )
+(1 )r = 9:
1 10 3). Changing the value of e would change the results. If e were small
enough there would be permanent uctuations for intermediate values of 
also for n = 3. On the other hand, for any n we could choose a value e high
enough such that there are no permanent uctuations.
Compared to the similar condition prevailing in the discrete-time model
e
z
< 1 (1 )r
1+(1 )r , the condition
e
z
< 1 (1 )r1
cosn(n )
+(1 )r becomes more restrictive when
n gets smaller (that is, when we move away from the discrete-time case).
ABBs result that permanent uctuations occur for intermediate values of 
is true only for a particular set of values for the parameters (for example, e
must be small enough). As n decreases this set shrinks. But as long as n > 2,
this set is never empty. In this sense the result ABB obtain in discrete time
is still qualitatively valid for any n > 2, but quantitatively the set shrinks.
How fast? Figure 4 features 1 (1 )r1
cosn(n )
+(1 )r as a function of n for  = 0:1 and
r = 1:02 (the horizontal line is the value for n innite).
Figure 4: Dependence of the domain of validity of ABBs result
on the lag distribution
5 10 15 20 25 30
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n
In the discrete-time model ABBs result holds when e
z
< 0:043, whereas
for n = 5 it holds when e
z
< 0:022. Thus, among the values of parameter
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e for which ABBs property holds in the discrete-time model, for more than
half of them this property already holds for n = 5.
The following intuition explains why the lower bound of e values for which
endogenous uctuations cannot occur (whatever the value of ) is an increas-
ing function of n. Remember that endogenous uctuations occur because of
cash-ow shocks to rmscapacity to borrow. For endogenous uctuations
to occur, two conditions must be satised. First,  has to be large enough
for borrowing to be substantial. Second,  has to be small enough for rms
to be nancially constrained. When n gets larger, the tendency of rms to
get out of synchronization diminishes, and a smaller  will su¢ ce to generate
enough borrowing for endogenous uctuations to occur. With smaller , the
second condition will also be easier to satisfy: rms will still be nancially
constrained even if their exogenous endowment e is a bit larger. Thus, it is
easier to get endogenous uctuations when n is larger: more pairs (,e) are
compatible with endogenous uctuations.
4 Conclusion
Applying Invernizzi and Medios approach, the present paper has shown that
Aghion, Bacchetta and Banerjees explanation of why economies at an inter-
mediate level of nancial development may be more unstable than either more
or less nancially developed economies is fairly robust to the continuoustime
versus discrete-time choice. When the discrete-time assumption is dropped
in favor of a random-lags assumption that is an intermediate case between
discrete and continuous time, the argument stays qualitatively the same ex-
cept in extreme cases when the variance of the lags is large (larger than half
the variance corresponding to the rst-order, continuous-time model).
Possible directions for further research would be to apply the random-lags
approach to models other than ABBs model, or to examine whether it can be
applied to issues purely related to aggregation rather than to time-modeling.
18
The Random-Lags Approach: Application to a Microfounded Model
References
Aghion Philippe, Bacchetta Philippe and Abhijit Banerjee (2004), "Fi-
nancial Development and the Instability of Open Economies," Journal of
Monetary Economics 51(6), pages 1077-1106.
Aghion Philippe, Banerjee Abhijit and Thomas Piketty (1999), "Dualism
and Macroeconomic Volatility," Quaterly Journal of Economics 114(4), pages
1359-1397, November.
Azariadis Costas and Bruce Smith (1998), "Financial Intermediation and
Regime Switching in Business Cycles," American Economic Review 88, pages
516-536, June.
Bernanke Ben and Mark Gertler (1989), "Agency Costs, Net Worth, and
Business Fluctuations," American Economic Review 79, pages 14-31, March.
Invernizzi Sergio and Alfredo Medio (1991), "On Lags and Chaos in Dy-
namic Economic Models," Journal of Mathematical Economics 20, pages
521-550.
Kiyotaki Nobuhiro and John Moore (1997), "Credit Cycles," Journal of
Political Economy 105, pages 211-248, April.
19
Part II
Small Price Change Response to a Large
Devaluation in a Menu-Cost Model
Abstract
In an empirical paper based on ve large devaluation episodes
in Argentina, Brazil, Korea, Mexico and Thailand, Burstein and al.
(2005a) nd a very slow adjustment in the prices of non-tradable goods
and services after large devaluations. Burnstein and al. (2005b) de-
velop a quantitative general-equilibrium model that can account for
this phenomenon. I consider an alternative, simpler model and explore
under which conditions moderate menu costs can explain the muted
response of the prices of non-tradables. The key new element in this
alternative model is a nominal friction in wage-setting (generated by
menu costs for changing wages). I nd, for example, that although my
model is based on menu costs, it is able to deliver not only constant
prices of non-tradables, but also small price changes (in reality these
prices do change, albeit by far less than the exchange rate). I also dis-
cuss the existence of multiple equilibria and the role of central-bank
credibility.
Keywords: large devaluation, exchange rate, pass-through, sticky
prices, sticky wages.
JEL Classication Number: F31.
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1 Introduction
The impact of monetary policy depends on whether exchange-rate changes in-
duce a change in the terms of trade (i.e. the relative price of home imports in
terms of home exports) and of the price of imports relative to non-tradables.
Consider, for example, a monetary expansion leading to a currency deprecia-
tion. If prices are sticky in producer currency, then the depreciation implies
an increase in the price of imports relative to domestic goods. This will lead
to expenditure-switching in favor of domestic goods, but the import price
increase may feed into domestic ination. On the other hand, if prices are
sticky at the retail level in the consumer currency, then the exchange-rate
change per se will have no impact on prices paid by domestic consumers and
there will be no imported ination (the monetary expansion underlying the
exchange-rate change may, however, have an impact on domestic consump-
tion through other channels).
The recent empirical literature on international pricing indicates that
the reality is between these two extremes: at the dock, prices are sticky
partially in producer currency and partially in buyer currency,1 whereas at
the retail level prices are usually sticky in consumer currency (the implication
is that there is no expenditure-switching on the consumer side, whereas there
might be some from importing rms; the implication for ination is that
higher import prices are not very dangerous as long as they do not translate
into higher retail prices that will in turn lead to wage increases and fuel an
inationary spiral2).
This conclusion, hinging on the distinction between the dock and retail
levels, reconcile the following otherwise diverging ndings. Some of the evi-
dence supports consumer-currency pricing. The fact that nominal exchange
rates uctuate widely in comparison to relative price levels (consumer price
indexes) indicates that at the retail level, prices are sticky in the consumer
currency. Engel (1993) and Engel (1999) present empirical ndings that indi-
cate that prices of non-tradables and tradables move to the same extent after
1Campa and Goldberg (2005) compute the pass-through in the short run (dened as
one quarter) at the level of an aggregated import bundle. They nd a lot of heterogeneity
across the OECD countries, some pass-throughs being well above 50 percent, and others
substantially below.
2There are still other implications. For example, the importing rms will have to
provide a bu¤er for the exchange rate shock by reducing their margins, which will reduce
their ability to invest if they are credit-constrained. More generally, this kind of e¤ect
is magnied if rms have borrowed in foreign currency. See for example Aghion et al.
(2004).
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a nominal exchange-rate shock. The following evidence on import and ex-
port prices supports producer-currency stickiness. Burstein and al. (2005c)
argue that tradables and non-tradables do not in fact react in the same way
to exchange-rate uctuations, and that if they seem to do so it is because
what is called "tradables" at the retail level incorporate a lot of non-tradable
services such as distribution and marketing: the relative price of pure traded
goods at the dock to non-tradables does indeed uctuate after a nominal
exchange-rate shock. Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (2000) nd that there is a positive
relationship between the nominal exchange rate and the terms of trade: if the
domestic currency depreciates then the price of home imports increases rela-
tive to home exports. This result is more consistent with producer-currency
pricing than with buyer-currency pricing.
These issues raise many theoretical questions concerning the pricing be-
havior of rms,3 their expenditure-switching following a nominal exchange-
rate shock,4 the optimal monetary policies and their links with rmsstrate-
gies.5 In these models, price- or wage-stickiness is often modeled as time-
dependent pricing (for example, prices are set one period in advance or are
set before the exchange-rate shock). This stickiness might be motivated by
menu costs, but how high the menu cost has to be for prices to stay sticky6
is usually not computed. One exception is Burnstein and al. (2005b), hence-
forth BER.7
3See for example Bacchetta and Wincoop (2005), Devereux and Engel (2001) and
Corsetti and Pesenti (2002). Two papers undertake to explain why consumer prices re-
spond less than import prices to nominal exchange-rate shocks: Bacchetta and Wincoop
(2003) model the optimal pricing strategies when importing rms assemble the intermedi-
ate imported goods and sell the nal good facing competition from domestic non-tradables,
whereas the explanation of Burnstein et al. (2005b) is based on the weight of non-tradables
(taking distribution services into account).
4Obstfeld (2003b) models the expenditure-switching e¤ect of exchange-rate changes
that operates at the rm rather than at the consumer level.
5See for example: i) Devereux and Engel (2006), concluding that in practice optimal
policy might seek to limit exchange-rate uctuations, ii) Obstfeld (2003a) who on the con-
trary defends the role of exchange-rate exibility in international adjustments, iii) Corsetti
and Pesenti (2002) who analyze endogenous optimal monetary unions, iv) Bacchetta and
Wincoop (2000) study the impact of the exchange-rate system on trade and welfare.
6The assumption that at a given date some price-setters cannot choose whether they
want to change their prices or not might be more questionable in an open economy than
in a closed economy since the nominal exchange rates tend to uctuate widely.
7There are still other exceptions such as Devereux (2006) who explores the relationship
between exchange-rate policy and price exibility, or Landry (2005) who introduces ele-
ments of state-dependent pricing and strategic complementarity into a new open economy
macroeconomic model with producer-currency pricing.
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In a preceding empirical paper based on ve large devaluation episodes
in Argentina, Brazil, Korea, Mexico and Thailand, Burstein and al. (2005a)
nd a very slow adjustment in the prices of non-tradable goods and services
to large devaluations. BER address the question of why the rate of ination
for non-tradable goods is so much lower than the rate of devaluation. They
develop a quantitative general-equilibrium model that can account for this
phenomenon. They assume menu costs for changing a price and show that
producers of non-tradables might prefer not to change their price at all even
if the devaluation is large. There are also cases in which it is not sustainable
as an equilibrium phenomenon for rms in the non-tradables sector not to
change their prices at all (in these cases it is argued that real shocks are the
primary driver of real exchange-rate movements). They incorporate several
assumptions into their model that mute the response of the price of non-
tradables to the exchange-rate shock. First, the share of tradable goods
in the consumer price index (CPI) is small. Second, there are domestic
distribution costs associated with the sale of traded goods. Third, there is a
low elasticity of the demand for exports. Fourth, there is a moderate elasticity
of substitution between tradables and non-tradables.8 Moreover, they deviate
from the Dixit-Stiglitz model, adopting Kimballs (1995) assumption that the
elasticity of demand for the output of a monopolistic producer is increasing
in its price relative to the prices of its competitorsgoods. They conclude,
however, by noting a shortcoming of their paper: the price of non-tradables
does not change at all, while in reality these prices do change, albeit by far
less than the exchange rate.9
Like BER, I aim at explaining why the rate of ination for non-tradable
goods is so much lower than the rate of devaluation. I consider an alter-
native, simpler model and explore under which conditions moderate menu
8The price of tradables will change after an exchange-rate shock. The direct impact of
this price change on non-tradables will, however, be small since BER assume a moderate
elasticity of substitution between tradables and non-tradables. But even if this elasticity
were zero, there would still be other channels through which price adjusments could be
induced. For example households would ask for higher wages in order to mute the impact
of the increase of the prices of tradables on their real wages. This would incite rms to
increase their prices in order to pass the price increase of the labor input on to consumers.
However, incorporating several assumptions that mute responses allow BER to get sticky
prices with moderate menu-costs.
9BER focus on rationalizing an equilibrium in which non-tradable goods prices do not
change at all. They do not say if their model could yield an equilibrium in which prices do
change a little. My conjecture is that it can not (at least if all rms have the same menu
costs): I expect that reducing incentives to change the prices of non-tradables in BERs
model would not lead to smaller price changes but might only determine whether prices
adjust perfectly or not at all.
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costs can explain the muted response of the prices of non-tradables. The key
new element in this alternative model is a nominal friction in wage-setting
(generated by menu costs for changing wages).10 For tractability, I consider a
partial-equilibrium model rather than a general-equilibrium model like that
of BER.
The intuition as to why this may explain small (but possibly not zero)
changes in the prices of non-tradables is the following. In a setting in which
the markup is a constant proportion of the marginal cost, the desired price
varies in the same proportion as the marginal cost. The marginal cost can
vary through two channels: a productivity change (due to a change in the
quantity produced if returns to scale are not constant) or a change in the
prices of production factors. A devaluation increases the price of imported
goods and tends to move consumption toward non-tradables, thus increasing
the quantity of non-tradables produced and reducing marginal productivity
(assuming decreasing economies of scale). Since I use the moderate elasticity
of substitution between tradables and non-tradables assumed by BER, this
rst channel by itself motivates a price change, albeit by far less than the
exchange rate. This leaves the second channel: the wage (I assume that labor
is the only production factor). If workers do not want to reset their wage, this
second channel is not active. Then the desired price change of non-tradables
rms is small, and this small change will occur if their menu cost is small
enough. But why would workers not reset their wage after a large devaluation
although they have two incentives to do so: i) to preserve their real wage and
ii) to compensate for higher labor disutility due to the increased quantity of
labor they must furnish? These two incentives may be so weak that they do
not outweigh even a moderate menu cost of resetting wages. First, the change
in price level is moderate since the change of the price of non-tradables is
small and the share of pure tradables (exclusive of distribution costs) in the
CPI is assumed, as in BER, to be moderate. Second, the change of labor
is also moderate since, as discussed above, production of non-tradables does
not increase much (and the production of tradables doesnt change much
either, since the prices of tradables are assumed to adjust completely and
there is no substitution between domestic and foreign tradables11).
I will try to avoid the shortcoming of BER consisting in not explaining
small positive changes in the prices of non-tradables. The di¤erence between
10I owe the idea of introducing wage stickiness, and, more generally, the model I use
here, to Philippe Bacchetta and Olivier Jeanne.
11For simplicitys sake, rather than modeling domestic tradables production, an exoge-
nous endowment of tradables is assumed.
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a small price response and no price response may seem to be irrelevant. It
is not. A small di¤erence may matter a great deal if it casts doubt upon
the underlying theory. In our case, one could think that a simple menu-
cost model can explain that prices do not change at all, if the menu cost
is high enough, but would not be able to explain (without an exogenous
price-staggering process) why prices adjust only partially. If a rm pays the
menu cost, why would it not adjust fully? This paper shows that a menu-
cost model can explain partial adjustment. In another setting, the same
concern has been expressed, for example, by Midrigan (2006) (he proposes
an extension of the state-dependent model in order to explain small price
changes and other micro-economic facts): The large number of small price
changes observed in the micro-price data might lead one to conclude against
state-dependent pricing models.
Assuming staggered price setting (like the Calvo process) and strategic
complementarity in price setting is the standard way to generate partial ad-
justment. However, assuming a time-dependent process is particularly debat-
able after a large shock. Moreover, whereas the Calvo process is motivated
by menu costs, these menu costs do not appear explicitly. Since I want to
examine how high these menu costs need to be to explain incomplete price
adjustment after a large devaluation, I need to explicitly have these costs in
the model.
For realistic values of the parameters, I get strategic complementarity
in price and wage setting. If all rms and workers adjust their prices and
wages, then any agent choosing to deviate would bear a large cost. Thus,
the equilibrium at which all agents adjust always exists for realistic menu
cost values. There may however also be other equilibria. If no agent adjusts,
then no agent would gain much by adjusting. Since this gain can be wiped
out by a small menu cost, no adjustment will also be an equilibrium as long
as the menu cost is not too small.
Interestingly, there are still other equilibria. In particular, workers may
prefer not to change their wages at all after a transitory devaluation. In
this case, rms in the non-tradables sector will not choose to fully adjust
their prices to the devaluation. I compute the minimal menu cost for wages
and the maximal menu cost for prices such that the price of non-tradables
increases by a small amount. The existence of this equilibrium, and more
generally the discussion of multiple equilibria, are the main contributions
of this paper, whereas BER focus on rationalizing an equilibrium in which
non-tradable goodsprices do not change at all. At the core of my paper are
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gures that make it possible to understand how the set of multiple equilibria
depends on values of menu costs.
I also discuss the role of central-bank credibility. A credible central bank
can eliminate the equilibrium in which all agents adjust. If the central bank
is not credible, it will have to generate a recession to achieve this result.
The plan of this paper is as follows. The assumptions of the model are
presented in section 2. Section 3 presents the equilibrium equations. Section
4 shows that small menu costs are enough to prevent a large change in the
non-tradables price and that it is possible for the prices of non-tradables to
change by a small amount. Section 5 shows that wage rigidity plays a crucial
role in getting this result. Section 6 discusses the importance of central-bank
credibility. Section 7 presents concluding remarks.
2 Assumptions of the model
This is a small open economy model. Non-tradables are produced with labor,
and there is a domestic endowment of tradables. The non-tradable goods
market, as well as the labor market, are cleared. Producers of non-tradables
are price setters and households are wage setters. The timing is as follows:
rms and households predetermine nominal prices before the occurrence of a
devaluation shock. First, domestic producers set their prices and households
set their nominal wages. Then the state of the world (devaluation or no-
devaluation) is revealed, and price and wage setters decide to maintain prices
and wages at the preset levels, or to pay the menu cost and change them in
response to the shock.
Firms maximize prot. There are two sectors: the tradables and the
non-tradables sectors. There is a continuum of di¤erentiated non-tradable
goods produced by a mass 1 of monopolistic producers i 2 [0; 1] with the
production function yi = ANLi .
The country exports or imports a tradable good (balanced trade account
is not assumed) for which the law of one price applies. Normalizing the dollar
price of this good to 1, the domestic currency price of the good PT is equal
to the exchange rate S:
PT = S .
For simplicitys sake, the country is assumed to receive an exogenous
endowment of tradable goods.
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There is a continuum of mass 1 of atomistic households indexed by h.
Each household provides its particular brand of labor, and the labor used in
production is a CES composite of the di¤erent brands given by
Li =
Z
l
 1

h;i
 
 1
;  > 1 ,
where lh;i is the amount of labor provided by household h to rm i. The total
amount of this labor composite in this economy is given by L =
1Z
0
Lidi.
Households maximize the following utility
uh = ch    l
1+
h
1 + 
under the budget constraint chP = whlh , where P =

P 1 T + (1  )P 1 N
 1
1 
is the general price level, wh is the wage received by household h, and ch is
a CES index of the consumption of tradable and non-tradable goods
C =


1
C
 1

T + (1  )
1
C
 1

N
 
 1
;  > 0 .
Notice that prot revenues are not included in the budget constraint.
This will simplify the expression for the households opportunity cost of not
adjusting its wage after an exchange-rate shock. This assumes that workers
have only labor income, while non-tradables producers earn prots but no
labor income and do not consume any non-tradables.
The consumption of non-tradable goods is itself a CES composite of dif-
ferent varieties:
CN =
Z
C
 1

N;i di
 
 1
;  > 1 .
The structure of nominal stickiness is as follows. In the non-tradables
sector, nominal prices are set before the occurrence of the shock, and can be
changed after this occurrence at a certain cost to the price-setter (all rms
have the same menu cost): if a rm chooses to adjust its prices, then menu
costs are subtracted from its prots. Prices can be changed at no cost the
next period. This is the same assumption, as for example, in Fishman and
Simhon (2005). Their interpretation is that rms receive new inventories in
odd-numbered periods, at which time labels must be applied to newly-arrived
units. Therefore, in an even-numbered period, changing a units price relative
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to the preceding period involves the additional cost of changing labels; in
odd-numbered periods, in contrast, price labels must be applied anyway so
a price change is costless. Thus, prices are assumed to be sticky for at most
one period. In the same way, wages are set by the households for one period
before the occurrence of the shock and can be changed after this occurrence
at a certain cost (the same menu cost for all households): if a household
chooses to adjust its wages, then menu costs are subtracted from its utility.
Alternatively, the exchange-rate shock can be assumed to be transitory and
to last (and be expected to last) only one period.
After prices have been set, the economy can be in one of two states char-
acterized by di¤erent nominal demands and exchange rates. The state of
no-devaluation occurs with a probability that, for simplicitys sake, is as-
sumed to be very small, so that the dependence of the preset levels on what
would happen in case of a shock can be disregarded although anticipations are
rational. In the no-devaluation state, the exchange rate is given by S = Sf
and domestic nominal demand is given by PN;fCN;f + PT;fCT;f = Nf . In
the devaluation state this becomes S = Sd and PN;dCN;d + PT;dCT;d = Nd,
where Sd Sf
Sf
is the rate of devaluation. Nf and Nd are exogenous. Notice
that PNCN + PTCT = N can also be written C  P = N . There are two
ways to interpret the exogeneity of N . First, one could assume that a trans-
action technology determines the relation between aggregate spending and
real money balances: C = M
P
, whereM is the nominal money stock. Then N
is simply equal to M chosen by the central bank.12 A second interpretation
of the exogeneity of N is that it is a way to capture other shocks. What-
ever the interpretation, C is given by N
P
where N is exogenously given. This
exogeneity explains why the impact on demand of interests paid or received
from the rest of the world need not be considered.
3 Equilibrium equations
The equilibria are given by the six following equations.13 Each variable in
this system of equations is a ratio of the corresponding variable in case of a
shock to this variable in the absence of a shock (labelled by the name of the
12The choice of M would also have an impact on the exchange rate. If we want to keep
the exchange rate shock exogenous in this interpretation, we need to assume that there is
a (transitory) disconnect between the exchange rate and M .
13See proof in appendix.
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corresponding variable with an index "r").14
3.1 Optimization by rms in the non-tradables sector
Since the probability of a devaluation is assumed to be very small, the pre-
set price can be considered equal to the price that would maximize prots in
the absence of a shock. Assuming that the rm is committed to satisfying
any demand at the chosen price, prots in cases of price adjustment a
(menu costs not yet subtracted) and without price adjustment n can be
computed. The di¤erence between a and n yields the rms private cost
of not adjusting (as it is well known, the social cost is higher because of
externalities) during the sole relevant period (by assumption the impact of
the shock is transitory). To get a sense of its magnitude, it is useful to take
the ratio of this di¤erence to prot  in the absence of a shock. This yields:
a   n

= (wr)
  ( 1)
[1 (1  1 )] Z
1
[1 (1  1 )] 

1  

1  1

 1 
Z   wrZ 1

1  1




,
(1)
where Z = (PNr)
  (Pr)
Cr and Cr = 1 (except for section 6, real consump-
tion will be assumed, for simplicitys sake, to be constant).
If GN is the cumulative of non-tradables rmsmenu costs (expressed
as a proportion of ), then the proportion N of non-tradables rms that
adjust their prices is given by N = GN
 
a n


. Since GN is assumed to
be degenerated (all rms have the same menu cost), N is either 0 or 1
depending on whether a n

is smaller or larger than the common menu
cost (N may take an intermediate value in the special case when a n is
exactly equal to the common menu-cost, since some rms may adjust while
other rms do not).
3.2 Optimization by households
Similarly, the ratio of the households utility cost of not adjusting (Ua  Un)
to its utility in the absence of a shock (U) can be computed, where Ua is the
utility in case of wage adjustment (menu costs not yet subtracted) and Un is
the utility if the household does not adjust its wage. This households private
14wr for wages, Pr for the price level, PNr for the price of the non-tradable aggregate,
Cr =
Nr
Pr
for the CES index of the consumption of tradable and non-tradable goods, Nr
for nominal demand, Lr for labor.
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cost of not adjusting its wage during the sole relevant period (expressed as a
proportion of its utility in the absence of a shock) is:
Ua   Un
U
=

P r Lrw

r
 1+
1+ 
 
1  1 
1

1 + 
! 1 "
P 1r Lrw

r   (Lrwr )1+
1  1

1 + 
#
.
(2)
If Gw is the cumulative of householdsmenu costs (expressed as a pro-
portion of U), then the proportion w of households that adjust their wages
is given by w = Gw
 
Ua Un
U

. Again, the cumulative is assumed to be de-
generate (all households have the same menu cost).
3.3 Denitions and market clearing conditions
The aggregate wage level is given by w =
24 1Z
0
(wh)
1  dh
35
1
1 
where wh is
the wage set by household h. Knowing that a proportion w of households
adjust their wages, and knowing which proportion of adjusting households
will change their wages, wr can be computed:
wr =

w
h
Pr (Lr)
 (wr)

i   1
1+
+ (1  w)
  1
 1
. (3)
A similar computation can be made for the aggregate price for non-
tradables, the aggregate price level and aggregate labor:
PNr =
(
N
h
(wr)
 (Pr)
(1 ) (Cr)
1  (PNr)
( )(1 )
i 1 
[1 (1  1 )] + (1  N)
) 1
1 
,
(4)
Pr =
"
(PTr)
1 
 + (PNr)
1 

 + 1
# 1
1 
,
where 
 = PTCT
PNCN
,
Lr = N

(wr)
  (PNr)
  (Pr)
Cr
 1
[1 (1  1 )]+(1 N)

(PNr)
  (Pr)
Cr
 1
 .
(6)
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4 Cases when wages are not adjusted
A change in the price of tradables has an impact on the price of non-tradables
through the goods market (if  6= 0) and through wages (I assume Cr exoge-
nous and equal to 1). If householdsmenu costs are high enough for wages
to stay constant (and thus wr = 1), then there is only the goods market
channel left, through which the impact might not be strong if the elasticity
of substitution  is close enough to 0 (BER set  = 0:4)15.
Formally, equation (4) becomes:
(PNr)
1  = N
8<:
"
PTr
PNr
1 

+1

+1
# (1 )
1 
(PNr)
(1 )
9=;
1 
[1 (1  1 )]
+ (1 N),
where N is given by equation (1).
 If the menu costs of rms are su¢ ciently high, then PNr = 1. This hap-
pens if their menu costs are higher than their private costs of not adjust-
ing their prices, which is equal (according to §3.1) to the following criti-
cal value: Z
1
[1 (1  1 )]  
h
1  

1  1

i 1 h
Z   Z 1

1  1



i
where
Z = (Pr)
 and Pr =
h
(PTr)
1 
+1

+1
i 1
1 
. The assumption that wages are
not adjusted implies (according to §3.2) that householdsmenu costs are
larger than

(Pr)
  Lr
 1+
1+  

1  1 
1

1+
 1
(Pr)
 1 Lr   (Lr)1+ 1 
1

1+

where Lr = (Pr)

 and Pr =
h
(PTr)
1 
+1

+1
i 1
1 
.
 If non-tradables rms have small enough menu costs then they will
change their prices. Then N = 1 (I assume that rmsmenu costs are
strictly smaller than the critical value and do not discuss the case in
which they are exactly equal to the critical value). Equation (4) be-
comes: (PNr)

1 
1 
 (
 + 1) =

PTr
PNr
1 

 + 1. This implicit equation
for PNr has only one solution. Knowing PNr and wr, critical menu costs
can be computed.
15Intuitively, if wr = 1 and  = 0, then we should have PNr = 1 since there is no open
channel left. Formally, equation (4) becomes in this case: P 1 Nr = NP
(1 ) 1 
1 +

Nr +1 N
which has PNr = 1 as unique solution.
31
Small Price Change Response to a Large Devaluation in a Menu-Cost Model
Numerical example
Lets numerically evaluate PNr and the critical menu costs for the follow-
ing calibration:
Table 1: Calibration
Value Justication
 = 0:4 BER. They quote Stockman and Tesar (1995), Lorenzo, Aboal and
Osimani (2003), and Gonzales-Rozada and Neumeyer (2003).
 = 0:25 BER. This value implies a labor-supply elasticity that coincides with
the standard value used in the real business-cycle literature.

 = 1=3 Implies that the pre-devaluation share of tradable goods in CPI
(distribution costs not included) is 25%. Burnstein et al. (2005a)
argue that tradable goods (distribution costs included) account for
roughly 50% of the CPI basket, but that about half of their costs
are distribution costs. This leaves a share of 25% for pure
tradable goods.
 = 6 This is a benchmark in the literature.
 = 2 Naknoi (2005) referring to the study by Huang and Liu (2002) who
nd that it can vary from 2 to 4.
 = 2=3 Is a realistic value for the share of labor income in GDP.
Cr = 1 Real consumption is assumed not to be a¤ected by the devaluation.
PTr = 2 The devaluation shock is such that the domestic currency loses
half of its value and the price of tradables doubles.
For this calibration, I nd the following values. Non-tradables rms do
not change their prices if their menu costs are larger than 2: 410 3. In this
case, householdsmenu costs must be larger than 2: 8 10 2 for households
not to change their wages. If non-tradables rms have menu costs small
enough to change their prices, then they adjust their prices by a factor PNr =
1:04. The critical rmsmenu cost, below which they adjust their prices, is
4: 3  10 2. This critical value is larger than the critical value obtained
in the case that other non-tradables rms do not adjust (2: 4  10 3) since
adjustment of other non-tradables prices create an extra incentive for a given
non-tradables rm to adjust its price. This means that for a menu cost
between 2: 4 10 3 and 4: 3 10 2 a non-tradables rm will adjust its price
or not depending on whether other rms do or not (multiple equilibria). The
menu cost of households has to be larger than 3:3  10 2 for them not to
increase their wage although the prices of non-tradables have increased.
For this calibration, this numerical example shows that a low small rms
menu cost is enough to be consistent with non-tradables rms not changing
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their prices. Since the price of non-tradables does not change, a quite low
householdsmenu cost is enough for households not changing their wage to
be an equilibrium. Moreover, I also obtain the possibility that the price
of non-tradables will change albeit by a small amount (this result was not
obtained in the BER model).
5 Cases when wages are adjusted
Lets assume now that householdsmenu costs are small enough for all wages
to adjust. Then equation (3) yields wr = Pr (Lr)
 where the amount of labor
depends, according to (6), on the quantities the rms want to produce, and
thus on the prices they set.
 If non-tradables rms have large enough menu costs to prevent them
from adjusting their prices, then PNr = 1, Lr = (Pr)

 , wr = (Pr)
1+ 


and the critical menu costs under which these results yield can be
computed.
 Non-tradables rms will adjust if they have small enough menu costs.
In this case equations (3) and (4) yield (PNr)
+(1 ) = (wr)
 (Pr)
(1 )
and wr = Pr

(wr)
  (PNr)
  (Pr)
 [1 (1  1 )] . Plugging equation (5)
for Pr into these equations yields two curves in the plane < PNr;wr >.
The solution is the intersection. Then knowing PNr and wr, the critical
menu costs under which these results yield can be computed.
For the above calibration I get the following values. A non-tradables rm
will not adjust its price when other non-tradables rms do not adjust if its
menu cost is larger than 0:11. This critical value is higher than what it was
when households did not adjust their wages since wage adjustment creates
an additional incentive for rms to adjust their prices (households multiply
their wages by a factor 1:3 which is smaller than the exchange-rate shock but
is still large enough to create a big incentive for rms to change their prices).
This critical value is so large that in this model it is very unlikely that a
rm will not adjust its price while the households are adjusting their wages.
This is the case even when the other non-tradables rms do not adjust their
prices. If they do, then the incentive to join them is even greater. I nd that
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for any realistic menu-cost values, an agent will always adjust when all the
other agents (households and non-tradables rms) do, and in this case price
and wage adjustments are complete. Thus, for this calibration I do not get
sticky prices for low rmsmenu costs if householdsmenu costs are small
enough for them to change their wages. Wage stickiness was crucial to get
the results of the previous section.
The equilibria discussed in this and in the preceding section are shown as
a function of rmsand householdsmenu costs in the Figure 1 (as mentioned
below, other equilibria exist but they are unstable).
Figure 1: Stable equilibria as a function of menu costs for Cr = 1
 = 0:4,  = 0:25, 
 = 1=3,  = 6,  = 2,  = 2=3, Cr = 1, PTr = 2.
This gure shows that full adjustment is an equilibrium for all realistic
values of menu costs. If menu costs are su¢ ciently small, this is the only
equilibrium. However, there are multiple equilibria for some larger menu
costs. For these parameter values, the equilibrium (hatched slanting to the
right), at which it is possible that the prices of non-tradable goods do not
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adjust while the wages adjust, exists only for unrealistically high rmsmenu
costs. But it is possible that neither the prices of non-tradables nor wages
adjust (shaded area). It is also possible that wages do not adjust while prices
do adjust (hatched slanting to the left).
This gure gives the equilibria as a function of rmsand households
menu costs. A gure showing the equilibria in the plane < PNr;wr > can
also be drawn. If the menu cost of rms is 2% and the menu cost of households
is 4%, then I get Figure 2:
Figure 2: Potential equilibria (zoom) for Cr = 1
 = 0:4,  = 0:25, 
 = 1=3,  = 6,  = 2,  = 2=3, Cr = 1, PTr = 2,
rmsmenu costs = 2%, householdsmenu costs = 4%.
In this gure there are two types of curves: the ones in bold focus on non-
tradables rms while the other ones focus on households. There are three
curves in bold. One curve corresponds to the case in which all rms adjust
(N = 1). The vertical axes (PNr = 1) correspond to the case in which
non-tradables rms do not adjust (N = 0). Finally, Curve I corresponds to
the case in which the menu cost is exactly equal to the private cost of not
35
Small Price Change Response to a Large Devaluation in a Menu-Cost Model
adjusting (and thus some non-tradables rms might choose to adjust while
others choose not to adjust). If a point < PNr;wr > is located above this
curve, then the cost of not adjusting is larger than the menu cost and all rms
would prefer to adjust. At a point located below this curve, no non-tradables
rm would prefer to adjust. Similarly, there are three curves not in bold
(horizontal axe included). The shaded area is the locus of points for which
0  N  1 and 0  w  1 . Thus, points outside the shaded area should be
disregarded. Even a point in the shaded area cannot be an equilibrium if it
is not at the intersection between a curve in bold and another curve. But the
reverse is not true: an intersection is not necessarily an equilibrium. Whether
a given intersection is or is not an equilibrium depends on the values of the
menu costs for rms and households. For example, the intersection between
PNr = 1 and w = 1 is not an equilibrium because it is located above Curve
I (the rms prefer to adjust their prices rather than stay at PNr = 1). But
if the menu cost of rms became su¢ ciently high, then Curve I would move
to the upper right-hand corner and would eventually have moved enough for
this intersection to be located below that curve. Thus, an intersection is a
potential equilibrium in the sense of being an equilibrium for some values of
the menu costs. In addition to the intersection shown in Figure 2 (which is a
zoom) there is an intersection at < 2; 2 > corresponding to full adjustment.
Figure 2 also helps to discuss the stability of these equilibria. For example
the intersection between Curve II and N = 1 is unstable: starting from a
point at the right but still near this intersection on the curve N = 1, such a
point would be above Curve II and all households would want to adjust their
wages, increasing wages and prices even more until the equilibrium < 2; 2 >
is reached. It can be seen that each of the four equilibria shown in Figure 1
is stable for menu-cost values for which it is indeed an equilibrium.
It may be surprising to see in Figure 1 that no amount of change of one
critical value can make up for a change in the other critical value in order to
yield the same equilibrium. As an example, lets discuss this for the PNr = 1
& wr = 1 equilibrium. If the householdsmenu cost is a little bit smaller
than the needed critical value then this equilibrium vanishes. No change
in the menu cost of rms can make up for it. In Figure 2 it is clear what
happens. The point < PNr;wr > = < 1; 1 > is located below Curve II when
the householdsmenu cost is equal to 4%. However, if the menu cost of
households were small enough, then the point < PNr;wr > = < 1; 1 > would
be located above Curve II and all households would want to adjust their
wages. Increasing the menu cost of rms would move Curve I, but would not
change the fact that < 1; 1 > is located above Curve II. Intuitively, if the
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householdsmenu cost is too small then households will adjust their wage
whatever non-tradables rms do.
One could reply that this example is special: the price of non-tradables
should have an impact on whether a household adjusts or not (and by how
much), but the price of non-tradables is a given in this example in which
non-tradables rms do not adjust. Thus lets consider the equilibrium
< PNr;wr > = < 1:04; 1 > at which the price of non-tradables adjusts. As
before, this equilibrium disappears if the householdsmenu cost is too small.
A decrease of PNr would indeed decrease the householdscost of not adjusting
and could compensate a small decrease in the householdsmenu cost. But a
change in the non-tradables rmsmenu cost would have no impact on PNr
except if it was so large that non-tradables rms prefer not to adjust their
prices (in which case the equilibrium < PNr;wr > = < 1:04; 1 > disappears
and the economy would be at < PNr;wr > = < 1; 1 >). Intuitively, one
could expect that the strong impact that a small menu cost change has
in this model (when it is near the critical value) is a consequence of the
assumption that all rms have the same menu cost and all households as
well. I conjecture that if the menu cost distribution is not degenerated, then
a change in the rmsmenu cost would have an impact on the proportion
of rms that adjust (and maybe on the price chosen by adjusting rms) and
thus on the aggregate price of non-tradables. In this case there would exist
a continuum of equilibria (di¤ering by PNr and/or wr) and a little change of
the average menu cost would usually not have a strong impact.
6 The importance of central-bank credibility
The central bank sets the real consumption of workers through setting money
supply (Cr = M=P ).16 The central bank chooses Cr such that prices of
non-tradables do not increase (or do not increase much) since it wants to
avoid the exchange-rate shock leading to ination. The problem is that
there are usually multiple equilibria. The set of equilibria depends on Cr.
If the central bank is credible, it only needs its preferred equilibrium to
belong to the set of equilibria (it will become the focal equilibrium). This,
however, is not su¢ cient if the central bank is not credible. In that case, even
16I assume that monetary policy can indirectly determine real consumption C by choos-
ing the nominal money supply M since C = MP . Notice that all our equilibrium equations
are still valid if we consider that M rather than Cr is exogenous. The reason is that the
rst-order equations are derived assuming that agents take P as exogenous. Thus MP will
be treated by the optimizing agents as exogenous as Cr.
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if its preferred equilibrium belongs to the set of equilibria, agents will not
necessarily focus on it. Thus, when the central bank is lacking in credibility, it
will have to generate a large enough recession (choose Cr small enough) that
the equilibrium it wants to avoid no longer belongs to the set of equilibria.
Lets assume that the monetary authorities want to avoid ination and
thus want rms of the non-tradables sector to choose not to adjust their
prices. Monetary authorities can achieve this goal by choosing a Cr such
that not (or barely) changing prices is the only optimal decision for price-
setters. This is always possible by choosing Cr su¢ ciently small. Figure 3
reproduces Figure 1 for Cr = 0:75 instead of 1, and shows how these stable
equilibria depend on menu costs.
Figure 3: Stable equilibria for Cr = 0:75
 = 0:4,  = 0:25, 
 = 1=3,  = 6,  = 2,  = 2=3, Cr = 0:75, PTr = 2.
Compared with Figure 1, the most important di¤erence is that the area
corresponding to the menu cost values for which there is an equilibrium, at
which all agents adjust, has shrunk. In Figure 1 it took up the entire area
visible on the graph (I didnt designate the corresponding zone in order not
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to overburden the gure). Here, the corresponding zone (hatched vertically)
is smaller. For example, this equilibrium is no longer obtained if the rms
menu cost=2% and the householdsmenu cost=4%. Moreover, producers of
non-tradables do not change their prices much when all agents adjust: they
increase them by only 5%. Thus, when Cr = 0:75 there is not much danger
of an increase of PNr and this increase would be small in any case (but there
is a possibility of a decrease of PNr: the surface (hatched slanting to the left)
corresponding to PNr = 0:91).
If the central bank wants to avoid an increase of PNr, it can do so by
choosing Cr low enough. But how low Cr has to be (that is, how large the
recession needs to be) depends on the credibility of the central bank. If the
central bank is not credible, then it will need to chose a Cr low enough for no
adjustment to be the only possible equilibrium at the given menu cost values
(or at least to exclude equilibria which imply an inordinately large increase
of PNr). If the central bank is credible, then it does not need to reduce Cr
that much (depending on the menu costs, it might not need to reduce Cr at
all) : it is enough that not adjusting belong to the multiple equilibria. This
implies that two identical countries that di¤er only by the credibility of their
central bank can end up with di¤erent Cr after an identical exchange-rate
shock. For example, if the menu cost is 2% for rms and 4% for households,
then, with the above parameter values, a credible central bank can keep real
consumption constant while a central bank that does not benet from this
credibility would have to decrease real consumption by a large amount. One
could ask what the maximum value of Cr would be such that the equilibrium
at which all agents adjust is excluded for the above parameter values. Figure
4 (a zoom on the relevant zone) shows, as a function of Cr, the critical menu
costs for rms and households such that all agents adjust only if menu costs
are smaller than these critical values.
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Figure 4: Critical menu costs for the equilibrium at which all
agents adjust
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To exclude the equilibrium at which all agents adjust, it is enough that
one of the menu costs is above the corresponding critical value. When the
menu cost of rms is 2% and the menu cost of households is 4%, then the
equilibrium at which all agents adjust is excluded at Cr = 0:76. Notice that
the curves are steep: a small change in Cr can have a large impact on the
menu-cost values compatible with all agents adjusting.
7 Conclusion
I have shown that menu costs can explain not only why the price of non-
tradables may remain unchanged after a large devaluation, but also why
it may change by a small amount. I usually obtain multiple equilibria. If
monetary policy is credible, the equilibrium preferred by the central bank
will be selected. If monetary policy is not credible, then the central bank
will have to generate a recession large enough that the equilibrium it wants
to be certain of avoiding is no longer one of the multiple equilibria.
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This paper could be extended in several directions. It would be interesting
to extend the model to general equilibrium (for example, foreign demand for
tradable goods could be modelized and real consumption endogenized), to
relax simplifying assumptions (for example, the assumption that prices are
fully exible following the rst period after the shock could be dropped), to
introduce savings and the interest rate (and maybe a monetary policy using
this interest rate as an instrument), to model the cause of the exchange-rate
shock (and its possible links to monetary policy), to integrate substantial
dynamics, and to allow for di¤erent rms having di¤erent menu costs (idem
for households). One may also want to explain in terms of menu costs faced
by producers of tradables why the price of tradables adjusts whereas the
price of non-tradables adjusts only to a small extent (intuitively, one could
expect that a rms opportunity cost of not adjusting its price is higher in
the tradables sector, in which the exchange-rate shock is felt more directly).
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Appendix: Equilibrium equations
Households
In the absence of shocks, a household maximizes its utility U = ch  
 l
1+
h
1+
under its budget constraint chP = whlh (assuming that workers have
only labor income), where h stands for household h, the line over a variable
indicates that it refers to the case without shocks, and lh =
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rst-order condition (with
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at equilibrium by: U =
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If there is a shock, either the household adjusts its wage or it does not
adjust. Let ewh be the wage chosen by households that adjust, and w the
aggregate wage after the shock, L the aggregate labor and P the aggregate
price. If a household adjusts, it will choose ewh = P  1Lw 11+ =
wh
h
P
P
 
L
L
  w
w
i 11+
= whY

1+ ; where Y  P
1

r Lrw

r , where all variables
with index "r" stand for the ratio of that variable after the shock to its value
before the shock. Its utility will be: Ua =
1+
 1 
(P  1w 1)
  1+
1+ L
1+
1+
1+
. If the
household does not adjust its wage, its utility will be: Un =
w

wh
w
1 
L
P
 


wh
w
 
L
1+
1+
=
w

P 
 1L
 w
w1+
 1 
1+
L
P
  

P 
 1L
 w
w1+
  (1+)
1+
L1+
1+
=
w

w
w1+
 1 
1+
L
P

P 
 1L

 1 
1+   

P 
 1L
 w
w1+
  1+
1+
L1+
1+
.
Plugging the above utilities into Ua Un
U
yields for the households oppor-
tunity cost expressed as a proportion of the utility before the shock:
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:
A household that adjusts its wage will workelh;a =   ewhw   L =  ewhwh ww  LL  whw   L = Y 1+  (wr) Lrlh = [P r Lrwr ] 11+ lh:
A household that does not adjust its wage will workelh;n =  whw   L =  ww  LL  whw   L = wrLrlh:
Producers of non-tradables
In the absence of shocks, producers of non-tradables maximize their prot
 = PN;icN;i   w

cN;i
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 1

; where i stands for rm i, and cN;i is the pro-
duction of rm i. Since the non-tradable good market (like all other mar-
kets) is assumed to be cleared, cN;i is also the quantity of products of rm
i that consumers want to consume at price PN;i, and is equal to cN;i =
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PN;i
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The 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:
If there is a shock, either the rm adjusts or it does not adjust. Let ePN;i
be the price chosen by a rm that adjusts. If a rm adjusts it will chooseePN;i = n ( 1)wA  1N (1  )P  (PN) C 1 1o 11+( 1 1)
= (wr)

[1 (1  1)] Z
1 
[1 (1  1)]PN;i;where Z = (PNr)
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46
Small Price Change Response to a Large Devaluation in a Menu-Cost Model
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Plugging the above prots into a n

yields the rms opportunity cost
expressed as a proportion of the prot before the shock:
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Let Li;a  labor used by rms that adjust and Li;n  labor used by
rms that do not adjust.
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Part III
Can a Hybrid Sticky-Price and
Sticky-Information Model Reconcile Stylized
Facts on the Frequency of Individual Price
Changes and on Ination Dynamics?
Abstract
This paper presents a rational expectations model compatible with
the two following stylized facts: i) individual rmsprices change every
six months to a year, ii) ination response to monetary shocks is
hump-shaped. The model considered is a hybrid of the sticky-price
and sticky-information models of price adjustment. The sticky-price
component delivers the rst stylized fact directly. I show that the
second stylized fact is also satised. Under the assumption that rms
price-setting decisions are strategically neutral, the ination response
to a transitory shock to the money-supply growth rate is hump-shaped
for the hybrid model, whereas it is monotonic for both the sticky-price
and sticky-information models. If the shock is permanent, then this
response is hump-shaped for the sticky-information and the hybrid
models, whereas it is at for the sticky-price model.
Keywords: hump-shaped impulse response, ination persistence,
Phillips curve, strategic complementarity.
JEL Classication Number: E31
I would like to thank my thesis advisor Professor Philippe Bacchetta for useful com-
ments, as well as the members of my thesis committee: Professors Harris Dellas, Jean
Imbs and Giovanni Favara.
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1 Introduction
Most macroeconomic models in the economic literature are unable to recon-
cile the two following stylized facts, at least not without abandoning rational
expectations:
 Frequency of individual price changes
The following quotation by Klenow and Willis (2006b) provides a good
summary of the literature on the frequency of price changes: "The
recent micro empirical literature [...] nds that nominal prices typically
change at least once per year. Bils and Klenow (2004) and Klenow and
Kryvtsov (2005) report that U.S. consumer prices change every six
months or so, on average. Dyne et al. (2005), surveying a spate of
recent studies, conclude that Euro Area prices typically change around
once per year. Similarly, Taylor (1999) summarized the earlier evidence
as saying prices change once a year on average."
 Ination dynamics
After a monetary shock, it takes more than one year for prices to com-
pletely adjust. The impact of a monetary shock on ination is not only
persistent, it is also hump-shaped. Mankiw (2001) argues that there
is a broad consensus that shocks to monetary policy have a delayed
and gradual e¤ect on ination. He refers to the traditional emphasis
on the "long and variable lags" of monetary policy and the refrain of
central bankers that they need to be forward-looking and respond to
inationary pressures even before ination arises. He also indicates
that it shows up in most empirical work. He refers to specic episodes
(Paul Volcker started his historic disinationary policy in the United
States in October 1979, but the big declines in ination came in 1981
and 1982) and to results from standard vector autoregressions.1 The
large VAR literature on the subject also conrms this nding. For
example, Christiano and al. (2005) nd that "ination responds in a
hump-shaped fashion, peaking after about two years."
It may seem di¢ cult to reconcile both stylized facts within the same
model: when prices are kept constant less than one year (as the micro-
economic stylized fact requires), it may seem di¢ cult to account for the
1He mentions however that there is some debate about when the maximum impact
occurs: Bernanke and Mark Gertler (1995) conrm the conventional wisdom that it occurs
after a long lag, nding that monetary shocks have no e¤ect on the price level at all during
the twelve months after the shock, whereas Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) nd shorter
lags, with monetary shocks having a large impact after two quarters.
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macroeconomic stylized fact that the impact of a monetary shock on ina-
tion persists for more than one year. Taylor (1980) shows, however, that
there is endogenous persistence: even if rms change their prices every year,
price adjustment will not be complete after one year if price setting is stag-
gered and if there is strategic complementarity in price setting (that is, rms
tend to avoid large changes of their prices relative to those of competitors).
Chari et al. (2000) respond that staggered price-setting cannot solve the
persistence problem. The feature key to their ndings is that their dynamic
stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model yields strategic substitutabil-
ity rather than strategic complementarity. Woodford (2003) argues that
the parameterization of Chari et al. (2000) implies a "considerable degree
of strategic substitutability," whereas they would nd substantial strategic
complementarity if they had taken into account the existence of rm-specic
production factors.
Even though assuming a high degree of strategic complementarity may
yield a su¢ cient degree of ination persistence, Mankiw (2001) notes that
a standard sticky-price model is unable to reproduce the hump-shaped re-
sponse of ination following a monetary shock. This is why Mankiw and Reis
(2002), henceforth MR, have proposed an alternative to the standard sticky-
price model: a sticky-information model.2 The main new feature of their
model is that nominal rigidity is not due to the cost of changing price tags
and menus, but to the cost of acquiring information in order to re-optimize
prices.3 While the standard sticky-price model features a Calvo staggered
price-setting process, motivated by menu costs, in which all rms face the
same constant probability of having the opportunity to change prices, MR
assume that in each period all rms face the same constant probability of be-
ing able to re-optimize current and future prices (henceforth, MR staggered
information-updating process). Between two re-optimizations, a rm follows
its price plan rather than keeping its price constant (since there is no menu
cost, there is no reason to keep prices constant).4
2Another advantage of the sticky-information model is that in this model, unlike in
the standard sticky-price model, anticipated disinationary policies have no expansionary
e¤ects.
3As discussed in Ball et al. (2005), imperfect information is a short-cut to the harder
task of modeling imperfect information-processing.
4In the sticky-information model, rms set their prices at a constant markup over
marginal cost. Thus, they do not need to know aggregate variables but only their own
marginal costs. This problem might be solved by assuming that rms do not know their
own marginal costs. This is an odd assumption that my hybrid model will inherit through
its sticky-information component.
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Altig et al. (2005) respond to Chari et al. (2000) by taking into ac-
count the existence of rm-specic production factors. This generates enough
strategic complementarity to yield realistic dynamics of ination even though
rms re-optimize prices on average only every 1.5 quarters. They respond to
the argument of Mankiw (2001) by generating the correct ination impulse
response thanks to a deviation from the standard Calvo staggering price-
setting process: they assume that rms that cannot re-optimize index their
prices to past ination rather than keeping them constant.5 Thus, they im-
plicitly assume that the underlying nominal rigidity is not a menu cost but
rather imperfect information on nominal variables or imperfect information-
processing.
The models of Mankiw and Reis (2002) and Altig et al. (2005) both have
their shortcomings. In particular, these two models yield a hump-shaped
ination response at the cost of assuming that prices change every period6
(they consider a period to be one quarter, as is usually done in this lit-
erature), which does not match the microeconomic stylized fact mentioned
above. Since this shortcoming stems from the assumption that there are no
menu costs, it is natural to try to x this problem by introducing some menu
costs into the model.7 Mash (2005) combines the standard sticky-price model
with a model of the same family as that of Altig et al. (the model of Chris-
tiano et al., 2005, which features indexation but not rm-specic capital).
Calibrating the weight of both models to match the microeconomic evidence,
he nds that the ability of his hybrid model to match the macroeconomic
evidence on ination persistence is severely compromised. But even if it had
matched macroeconomic evidence, the deviation from rational expectations
would still be problematic. Mash (2005) argues that if rms could choose
their degree of indexation optimally, they would choose a value that corre-
sponds to their belief about the actual persistence of ination, which would
lower persistence over time, converging to a stable long-run value of zero for
both actual and perceived persistence.
Collard and Dellas (2006) build a rational expectations model compatible
with the two stylized facts mentioned above. They assume a standard Calvo
5See Minford and Peel (2004), Mash (2005) and Collard and Dellas (2006) for a dis-
cussion of the role of this assumption.
6Although there is stickiness, prices change every period except in the special, and in
the long run unrealistic, case of zero ination.
7See also Collard and Dellas (2006) In our view, this [assuming Calvo process without
indexation] is the more realistic scenario as the evidence on price setting suggests that
rms set their prices infrequently and discretely, and in between price jumps, prices remain
constant.
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price-staggering process completed with imperfect information. They assume
that agents learn about the true aggregate state of the economy gradually,
using a Kalman lter based on a set of signals on aggregate variables. They
nd that short-lived misperceptions of the state of the economy limit initial
responses while propagating the shocks over time through the real rigidities.
In this paper I propose another alternative. I build a hybrid model incor-
porating both Calvo staggered price-setting and MR staggered information-
updating, thus combining both underlying sources of nominal rigidity, i.e.
menu costs and information costs.8 Such a hybrid model can deliver the
above-mentioned microeconomic stylized fact (and also yields heterogeneity
of ination expectations9). It avoids having the shortcoming of the sticky-
information model, since in the hybrid model prices do not change every
period.10 It also delivers the same average duration between a shock and
a rms rst response to it as in the sticky-price model, without having to
assume that prices are, on average, kept constant as long as in that model.
The reason is that, in the hybrid model, to respond to a shock, rms must
not only have an opportunity to change their prices but also need to be in-
formed about the shock. For simplicity and for comparability, I stay as close
as possible to MRs framework, although this has some drawbacks, such as
my model inheriting the partial-equilibrium feature of MRs model.
8There are other papers that combine frictions based on menu costs and information
costs. As in Collard and Dellas (2006), one of these frictions is, however, usually neither
MRs sticky information nor sticky prices. Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) assume a
one-period decision lag in a standard sticky-price model. Woodford (2003) extends this
setting to an arbitrary number of lags. Kiley (1996) proposes a hybrid of a sticky-price
model (with endogenized probability of price adjustments) and an imperfect-information
model, which, however, is di¤erent from the sticky-information model. What is usually
called the hybrid model in the literature is a model such as that of Gali and Gertler
(1999), in which some agents have backward-looking ination expectations and the rest
have rational expectations. Ball (2000) assumes that in forecasting ination, agents use
only an optimal univariate forecasting rule.
9Mankiw and al. (2004) argue that the sticky-information model is capable of explain-
ing many features of the observed evolution of both the central tendency and the dispersion
of ination expectations over the past fty years.
10If the money-supply growth rate is zero, then, even in the sticky-information model
rms do not change their price every quarter. In this case, the hybrid model would not
match the frequency of individual price changes better than the sticky-information model.
The case of zero money-supply growth rate is, however, not empirically relevant, since
the average money-supply growth rate is usually di¤erent from zero. As is often done in
this literature (see for example Woodford, 2003), I will use equations linearized around a
zero-ination steady state to discuss cases in which the average long-run ination is near
zero but not necessarily equal to zero.
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One challenge for new Keynesian models is to explain data while not
assuming too much friction. Thus, adding two kinds of frictions may seem to
be counterproductive. However, considering two types of frictions does not
necessarily imply a larger overall amount of friction, but may only change
the structure of the frictions involved. Moreover, I argue that the sticky
information friction is not enough. Something else is necessary (except when
ination is zero) to replicate the empirical fact that prices do not change
every period. Adding the Calvo process to MRs model makes it possible to
replicate that fact, without necessarily compromising the ability of the model
to match the macroeconomic evidence on the ination response to monetary
shocks (depending on the type of shock, it may even improve it).
One could think that a hybrid of the sticky-price and the sticky-information
models would yield an average of the macroeconomic performance of the two
pure models. If one believes as MR do that the sticky-information model
yields better results than the sticky-price model, this would lead to the con-
clusion that the hybrid model may not fare as well as MRs model in the
macroeconomic dimension. I show, however, that the hybrid model is not an
average of the two pure models. In the case of strategic neutrality in price-
setting,11 the impulse response of ination to an unexpected shock to the
level of money supply is the same in the sticky-information model as in the
sticky-price model.12 Moreover, their common ination response is strictly
decreasing rather than hump-shaped. However, I will show for this case that
the hybrid model is able to generate a hump-shaped ination response, while
both pure models deliver the same strictly decreasing ination response.
The intuition is the following. In the sticky-price model, rms set their
prices (when they have an opportunity to do so) equal to a weighted average
of future desired prices (a desired price is the price a rm would choose if it
faced no nominal rigidity). In the sticky-information model, when rms get
new information, they set a price plan in which the price at each date is equal
to the expected desired price. In case of strategic neutrality, however, the
desired price does not depend on the aggregate price level but only on the
money supply.13 Now consider an unexpected and once-and-for-all change
11That is, a rms desired price does not depend on the prices set by its competitors.
This is an assumption located between those of Woodford (2003) and Chari et al. (2000).
12MR, as well as Keen (2005), notice that the ability of a sticky-information model to
produce a long delay in the peak ination response depends critically on the degree of
strategic complementarity.
13MR note that in the case of strategic neutrality the desired price moves only with
the money supply: rms adjust their prices immediately upon learning of the change in
policy; as a result, ination responds quickly (much as it does in the sticky-price model).
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in the money-supply level. In this case, all rms set their prices equal to
the new long-term equilibrium level as soon as they have the opportunity
to change their prices knowing that the shock has taken place (from now
on, I refer to this price adjustment as the "rst informed price-adjustment").
They will not need to reset them later on. All rms change their prices by the
same amount, determined by the di¤erence between the new money-supply
level and the old one. Thus ination at a given date is proportional to the
number of rms that have the opportunity to change their prices and have
received the information that the shock has occurred. In both the sticky-
price model and the sticky-information model, this number decreases since it
is a constant fraction of a decreasing set of rms: in the sticky-price model
this is the set of the rms that have not yet had the opportunity to change
their prices since the shock, whereas in the sticky-information model it is the
set of rms that are not yet informed. In the hybrid case, rms setting their
rst informed prices today are either rms already informed in the last period
and receiving the opportunity to change prices today, or rms that were not
yet informed in the last period but are receiving information today as well as
the opportunity to change prices. The key point is that the number of rms
already informed in the last period and receiving the opportunity to change
prices today is a hump-shaped function of time. Immediately after the shock,
this set is small because only very few rms are informed. After a su¢ ciently
long time, almost all rms are informed, but they have also almost all had
the opportunity to change their prices, so the set is small again. In between,
this set reaches a maximum.
This example shows that the hybrid model is not simply a weighted aver-
age of the two pure models, but can be superior to both. I am not arguing,
however, that the sticky-information model cannot deliver a hump-shaped in-
ation response. Assuming strategic complementarity, MR have found that
the sticky-information model delivers a hump-shaped response.14 I nd that
this is true even with strategic neutrality if a permanent shock occurs to the
money-supply growth rate rather than to the money-supply level. In this
14The following intuition explains why in the case of strategic complementarity the re-
sponses di¤er in the sticky-price and the sticky-information models. In the sticky-price
model, the ination response is maximal when the shock occurs, since the incentive to
change prices is greatest at this time (later, the economy will be closer to its new equilib-
rium). In the sticky-information model rms do not need to overshoot their price changes
in order to avoid being stuck in the future with prices that are out of line with those of
competitors since they set a price plan rather than a price level (they can plan to increase
their prices later when more rms are informed of the shock). The ination response
increases until a peak is reached, after which it converges toward zero as more and more
rms are informed and most of the adjustment has already taken place.
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case, the ination responses are qualitatively similar in the hybrid and in
the sticky-information models, and both are clearly di¤erent from the sticky-
price model response. Thus, assuming strategic neutrality in price setting,
the hybrid and sticky-information models yield, qualitatively, the same in-
ation impulse response to a permanent shock to the money-supply growth
rate. When this shock is more transitory in nature, then the ination impulse
response of the sticky-information model tends to lose its hump, whereas it
stays hump-shaped in the hybrid model: if the shock to the growth rate is
completely transitory, then it is equivalent to a shock to the level, and the
hybrid model delivers a hump-shaped ination response whereas the two pure
models deliver the same strictly decreasing response.
In this paper I assume strategic neutrality in price setting for three rea-
sons. First, there is currently some debate about what degree of strategic
complementarity is realistic. As mentioned above, the strategic-neutrality
assumption is compatible with the literature. Second, shutting down the
strategic-complementarity channel makes it possible to show that a hump-
shaped ination response can be generated even in the absence of strategic
complementarity. The strategic-neutrality assumption also makes it easier
to show in which sense the hybrid model is di¤erent from an average of
the two pure models. The third reason is that strategic neutrality is the
only case (except in the extreme cases in which the hybrid model reduces
to one of the two pure models) in which the hybrid model yields an exact
closed-form solution. As a rst pass, it therefore seems reasonable to as-
sume strategic neutrality since it is compatible with the literature, yields
interesting results and is easier to compute. This however has a cost. Ball
and Romer (1990) have shown that nominal frictions alone are not enough
to cause business uctuations generating large welfare losses. This suggests
that assuming strategic neutrality would imply large menu costs or small
welfare loss. These issues are di¢ cult to discuss in my model since, as in
MR, neither menu and information costs nor the utility function are explicit.
Another issue is that strategic complementarity is likely to be necessary to
get endogenous persistence. Thus, concerning the macro stylized facts, I will
focus on the hump-shaped path of the ination impulse response. I leave for
further research the task of explaining endogenous persistence in a hybrid
model with  smaller than 1.
On the way to computing ination impulse responses, I derive the Phillips
curve for the hybrid model without, at this stage, assuming strategic neu-
trality. One novel feature of this Phillips curve is that it involves a new kind
of expectation operator. Since all rms are not perfectly informed, it is not
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surprising that the expectation Et (t+1) of next period ination which enters
the Phillips curve is not the expectation Et (t+1) based on the best knowl-
edge available at time t. However, Et (t+1) is not the average of aggregate
ination expectations but the average of the rmsexpectations about their
own price increases.
Dupor et al. (2006) and Klenow and Willis (2006) discuss hybrid models
similar to the one in this paper (they propose, however, general equilibrium
models). Dupor et al. (2006) nd that both sticky prices and sticky infor-
mation play an important role for ination dynamics. Their work is more
empirically oriented than mine, whereas I stay closer to MRs framework
and nd closed-form solutions for the impulse response of ination. Klenow
and Willis (2006) focus on making the link between their hybrid model and
new microeconomic evidence. They nd "modest support" for the sticky-
information model and the hybrid model. Paustian and Pytlarczyky (2006)
also develop a model merging sticky prices and sticky information, but in
their model no rm faces both frictions: some rms face sticky prices, while
others face sticky information. This setup allows them to assess the im-
portance of sticky prices versus sticky information in a nested model that
reduces to either specication in the extreme cases. They nd that the
data favors the sticky-price model over the sticky-information model. Be-
sides these three papers, there are several empirical papers comparing the
sticky-price and the sticky-information models without actually building a
theoretical hybrid model. Their aim is usually to choose the best among the
two or more models.15
The plan of this paper is as follows. Section 2 discusses the assump-
tions about when rms receive information or an opportunity to change their
prices. Probability distributions resulting from merging the Calvo staggered
price-setting process and the MR staggered information-updating process
are computed (for example, the distribution of the time of the rst informed
price-adjustment after a shock). This time-dependent process must be imbed-
ded in an economic environment in order to yield the magnitude of price
changes (rather than their timing only). Section 3 presents the basic equa-
tions of this environment, staying as close as possible to MRs framework.
Section 4 derives the Phillips curve. Section 5 focuses on the case of strategic
neutrality in price setting and presents the ination impulse response in the
cases of three unanticipated shocks: a transitory shock to the money-supply
growth rate (or equivalently a permanent shock to the money-supply level),
15For example: Keen (2005), Korenok (2005), Korenok and Svanson (2006), Laforte
(2005) and Trabandt (2006).
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a permanent shock to the money-supply growth rate, and the intermediate
case of a persistent but not permanent shock to the money-supply growth
rate. Section 6 presents concluding remarks.
2 The hybrid price-setting and information-
updating process
This section merges Calvo staggered price-setting andMR staggered information-
updating and computes two relevant distributions. The way I merge these
two processes is very simple, perhaps the most obvious way to model a rm
facing both kinds of nominal rigidities (menu costs and imperfect informa-
tion).
The Calvo sticky-price process assumes that each rm is always perfectly
informed but each period it faces a constant probability  of being exoge-
nously given an opportunity to change its price (prices are kept constant
between two such opportunities). One possible implicit story behind this as-
sumption is that rms are hit by random idiosyncratic shocks, and because
of high menu costs, they change their prices only when such a shock hap-
pens (assuming that idiosyncratic shocks are more important to rms than
monetary shocks).
MRs staggered information-updating assumes that each rm can change
its price every period at no cost, but each period it faces a constant proba-
bility  of being given updated information exogenously (between two such
opportunities, prices follow the old plan based on outdated information16).
One possible implicit story behind this assumption is that rms receive in-
formation randomly17 or that they have to make a report on the economic
situation at random points in time (for reasons not connected to price setting)
and may then use this information for the next time they set prices.
My hybrid process is based upon the assumption that each period a rm
faces a probability  of being given an opportunity to change its price and
a probability  of being given updated information. These two events are
assumed to be independent (this is the case if opportunities to set prices
16MR assume that, between two re-optimizations, a rm does not know or does not take
account of such information as how much it has sold.
17For example Carroll (2003) assumes that in any given period each individual faces a
constant probability of reading the latest forecast in an article (individuals who do not
encounter an article about ination simply continue to believe the last forecast they read).
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are determined by random idiosyncratic shocks, news arrives randomly, and
these two random processes are independent).18 As in the sticky-price model,
a rm keeps its price constant between two opportunities to change prices.
Firms remember past information when they are given the opportunity to
reset prices, and so choose a price based on their last-updated information.
This hybrid model encompasses the two pure models. It yields the sticky-
price model if  = 1, and yields the sticky-information model if  = 1. The
possibility that  be di¤erent from 1 is the only di¤erence between my hybrid
model and MRs sticky-information model since, as discussed in section 3, I
otherwise preserve their economic environment (except for focusing on the
strategic-neutrality case in section 5). Since I have assumed that the two
pure processes are independent, any interaction between these processes will
come only from the fact that a rm can respond to a shock in the hybrid
model only if it is both aware of the shock and has an opportunity to change
its prices after the shock has occurred.
2.1 Probability that a current price was set j periods
ago based on information last updated j+k periods
ago
Let 
j;k be the probability that the price of a rm at time t was set at
t   j (and stayed constant since then) based on information last updated
at t   j   k. The rm faced a probability  of being able to change its
price at t   j, a probability (1  )j of not being able to change its prices
during the j periods until t. Thus, the probability that at t a rm had its last
opportunity to change its price at t j is  (1  )j. Similarly, the probability
that the information available at t  j was last updated at t  j   k is equal
to  (1  )k: the probability  of updating information at t   j   k times
the probability (1  )k of not being able to update information during the
k periods until t  j. Since both processes are independent, the probability
that the current price of a rm was set j periods ago based on information
last updated j + k periods ago is:

j;k =  (1  )j (1  )k . (2.1)
18Here I do not consider the case in which price setting and information updating are
state dependent. In this case, the two processes may not be independent. For example, if
rms choose to always update their information when they have an opportunity to change
their prices, then the hybrid model would in fact be the same as the sticky-price model.
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Because of the law of large numbers, 
j;k is also the proportion of rms
in this situation.
For a time unit of a quarter, MR choose  = 0:25 for the sticky-price
model, and  = 0:25 for the sticky-information model, because in each case
a rm on average makes an adjustment once a year. How should  and  be
chosen in the hybrid model? One possibility is  = 0:25 and  = 0:25. This,
however, implies that the duration between a shock and the rst informed
price-adjustment is more than one year since overall nominal rigidities have
been increased. Lets compute under which condition on  and  the average
adjustment interval is equal to one year.
2.2 Lag between a shock and the rst informed price-
adjustment
Lets compute the probability t that a rm sets its rst informed price-
adjustment t periods after the shock (the nature of this shock is not im-
portant here, since the price response is not computed in this section). In
some particular settings (to be discussed below), this probability will be of
particular importance since the ination response will be proportional to it.
Lets assume that an unanticipated monetary shock occurs at the beginning
of the period t = 0, with some rms possibly already informed of this shock
at t = 0 before setting their prices (or equivalently, the shock occurs at the
end of period t =  1 when rms have already set their prices for period
t =  1): at time t = 0 (and possibly later on as well) money supply di¤ers
from what all the rms previously expected. A rm that set its rst informed
price adjustment at t may have been rst informed of the shock at t  j (the
probability that this happens is  (1  )t j), and then had to wait j periods
to receive an opportunity to change its price (the probability that this hap-
pens is  (1  )j). Thus, the probability that a rm sets its rst informed
price adjustment at t while having been rst informed of the shock at t  j is
 (1  )j (1  )t j = 
j;t j. Since j could be anywhere between 0 and t,
the probability t that a given rm sets its rst informed price adjustment
at t is the sum over 0  j  t of 
j;t j:
t =
tX
j=0

j;t j =
tX
j=0
 (1  )j (1  )t j =
(
 (1 )
t+1 (1 )t+1
  if  6= 
2 (t+ 1) (1  )t if  =  :
(2.2)
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Except for the pure cases  = 1 or  = 1, the probability t is a hump-
shaped function of t. The maximum occurs at:
tmax =
8>><>>:
ln( ln(1 )ln(1 ))
ln( 1 1 )
  1 if  6=  and  6= 1 6= 
  1
ln(1 )   1 if  = 
0 if  = 1 or  = 1
: (2.3)
The expectation of the distribution t is 1 +
1

  2. Taking into ac-
count that it is possible to have an informed price-adjustment at t = 0, a
rst informed adjustment at t implies a duration before the rst informed
adjustment of t+ 1. Thus, the average duration is 1

+ 1

  1. In the sticky-
price model,  = 1 and this average duration is 1

(and  = 0:25 yields an
average duration of four quarters). Similarly, this duration is 1

in the sticky-
information model (and  = 0:25 yields an average duration of four quarters).
In the hybrid case, an average duration of four quarters implies the following
condition: 1

+ 1

= 5. Assuming that  = , this yields  = 0:4 = .
For an average duration of four quarters (in the hybrid case  =  is also
assumed), Figure 1 shows the distributions of time t of the rst informed
price-adjustment after a shock occurring at the beginning of period 0.
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Figure 1: Distribution of time at which the rst informed price
adjustment occurs (average duration: 1 year)
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Hybrid, lambda=0.4, gamma=0.4
Two curves are shown in this gure. The pure sticky-price model and
the pure sticky-information model yield the same strictly decreasing curve.
The hybrid model with  = 0:4 =  yields a maximum one quarter after the
shock.19
The distribution for the hybrid curve is hump-shaped (at least for these
parameter values), and is thus qualitatively di¤erent from the two pure mod-
els, which have the same decreasing curve. The intuition is the following.
In both pure models the set of rms that have not yet had an informed
price-adjustment decreases over time. Since the rms that set their rst in-
formed price-adjustment at a given date is a xed fraction of this set, their
number also decreases. In the hybrid model, the rms that set their rst
informed price-adjustment at a given date were either informed of the shock
beforehand, or not even informed. The set of uninformed rms decreases
over time. But the set of informed rms that have not yet had the opportu-
nity to change their prices increases, in the hybrid model, at the beginning
(at the very beginning it is empty since no rm is informed) and decreases
19Notice that even for the hybrid model, the curve may not be hump-shaped (in a
discrete-time representation) if this hybrid is su¢ ciently close to a pure case.
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only after having reached a maximum (in the long term, it decreases toward
emptiness since the proportion of rms that have not yet had an informed
price-adjustment converges toward zero).
3 The economic environment
The last section has only discussed the probability of some events assuming
a constant probability  of receiving an opportunity to change prices and an
independent probability  of updating information. To study the dynamics
of ination, however, it is necessary to know not only when rms change their
prices, but also by how much. The price a rm wants to set depends on the
economic environment in which the price-setting and information-updating
process is imbedded. I follow the simple framework of MR, in which rms set
their prices equal to a weighted average of current and future desired prices.
As in MR, I assume:
pt = pt + yt , (3.1)
yt = mt   pt . (3.2)
Equation (3.1) says that a rms desired price pt depends on the overall
price level pt and the output gap yt (where all variables are expressed in logs
and potential output is normalized to zero). In periods of booms, marginal
costs rise and each rm would like to raise its relative price. This equation
could be derived from the rms prot-maximization problem (although the
real marginal cost of the rm would appear rather than the output gap) and
 could be expressed in terms of deep parameters. Combining equations
(3.2) and (3.1) yields pt = (1  ) pt+mt. Therefore  = 1 corresponds to
the strategic-neutrality case.
Equation (3.2) expresses aggregate demand as a function of pt and an
exogenous variable mt, which can be interpreted as the log of money supply
or, more broadly, as incorporating the many other variables that shift aggre-
gate demand.20 More generally, aggregate demand would also depend on the
nominal interest rate. Here, however, I follow the simple approach of MR
and exclude this possibility.
20This equation is used to derive the impulse response function, but not the Phillips
curve.
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Let xt;k be the price actually set at time t by a rm receiving the oppor-
tunity to set its price at time t and holding information updated for the last
time at time t   k. This rm sets xt;k equal to an average of its expected
desired prices for time t and later, weighted by the probability that the price
set at time t will not have changed:
xt;k = 
1X
j=0
h
(1  )j Et k
 
pt+j
i
; (3.3)
where Et k is the expectation of rms with information last updated at time
t  k (or equivalently the expectation of the best-informed rms at t  k).
In the sticky-price case, a rm is always informed, thus k = 0 and equation
(3.3) becomes xt;k=0 = 
1X
j=0
h
(1  )j Et
 
pt+j
i
. In the sticky-information
case,  = 1, and equation (3.3) is rewritten as xt;k = Et k (pt ).
21
The aggregate price level is the average of prices set by the various cohorts
of rms, weighted by the proportion of rms in each cohort:
pt =
1X
j=0
1X
k=0

j;kxt j;k where 
j;k =  (1  )j (1  )k . (3.4)
In the sticky-price case ( = 1) equation (3.4) becomes pt = 
1X
j=0
(1  )j xt j;k=0.
In the sticky-information case ( = 1) equation (3.4) becomes pt =

1X
k=0
(1  )k xt;k.
4 The Phillips curve
The Phillips curve yields a relationship between prices and the output gap.
This is an intermediate stage before computing the ination impulse re-
sponse, since plugging equation (3.2) into the Phillips curve yields a rela-
tionship between prices and money supply. This section presents the Phillips
curve without yet assuming strategic neutrality.
21(1  )j is, in fact, undetermined when  = 1 and j = 0. Actually, this is calculated
assuming  innitesimally close to 1 but not equal to 1. The resulting formula is indeed
the same as the one used by Mankiw and Reis (2002) for the sticky-information case. A
similar comment applies in other places in this paper.
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Appendix I shows that, after some tedious algebra, equations (3.1), (3.3)
and (3.4) yield the following Phillips curve:
t   Et (t+1) = 
2
1   [yt + "t (p

t )] ; (4.1)
where "t is an operator that takes the sum of expectation errors made at
t (i.e. the average of expectation errors made by various cohorts weighted
by the number of rms in each cohort). In the hybrid model, the sum of
expectation errors made at t on pt , is equal to:
"t (p

t ) = 
1X
k=1
(1  )k [Et k (pt )  pt ] : (4.2)
The term Et (t+1) in equation (4.1) is dened as follows:
Et (t+1) = 
"

1X
k=0
(1  )k xt+1;k+1   pt
#
. (4.3)
The expectation operator Et obviously di¤ers from the expectation Et
established on the basis of the best information available at t (or equiva-
lently, made by the best-informed agents at t), since there is no reason why
only the expectations of the best-informed rms should matter while the
ination expectations of rms setting their price at time based on old infor-
mation would be completely neglected. What is perhaps more surprising is
that the relevant expectation operator is not simply an average of the var-
ious ination expectations.22 Equation (4.3) gives the ination expected to
prevail at time t+1 when the aggregate price level at t+1 is expected to be

1X
k=0
(1  )k xt+1;k+1 while the aggregate price level at time t is known to be
pt. One interpretation is the following: make a survey asking all rms23 by
how much they expect to increase their own prices from t to t+1 (dont ask
them about their expectations for the increase of the aggregate price level);
then Et (t+1) is the sum of these expected price increases. The proof is the
following. Each rm will answer that it faces a probability 1   of keeping
22The average ination expectation is 
"

1X
k=0
(1  )k Et k (pt+1)  pt
#
. See section 5
for a specic example in which the operator Et (t+1) is shown to be di¤erent from the
average ination expectations.
23Ask all rms once they know if they can reset their price at time t or not (rms that
cannot reset their prices at time t are also to be included in the survey).
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its price constant, and a probability  of being able to reset its price. Thus,
its expected increase of its own price is  times the di¤erence between the
price it expects to set if it is able to reset it and its current price (all rms
are aware of their current prices). Summing all these answers yields equa-
tion (4.3):  times the di¤erence between the sum 
1X
k=0
(1  )k xt+1;k+1 of
all answers about the prices rms would expect to set at t + 1 (if they can)
and the sum pt of their current prices.
It is easy to verify that if  = 1, equation (4.1) boils down to the sticky-
price Phillips curve t   Et (t+1) = 21 yt (given, for example, in MR). In
fact, when  = 1, then "t (pt ) = 0 (i.e. there are no expectational errors
at t on pt since all rms are informed) and Et (t+1) = Et (t+1) (since all
rms have the same information set). In the other pure case, if  = 1, then
Et (t+1) disappears (rms do not need to take account of future ination
when setting their current prices, since they can change their prices in every
period), and the Phillips curve is given by yt + "t (pt ) = 0, which can be
shown to be equivalent to the Phillips curve computed by MR for the sticky-
information model.
The hybrid Phillips curve could be compared with the Phillips curves of
other models. Three models would be particularly interesting in this respect.
Woodford (2003) assumes that information-updating does not occur with a
constant probability but is simply delayed by a xed number of periods (thus
extending a model he wrote with Rotemberg, in which the delay is always
one period). Altig et al. (2005) assume that between two re-optimizations
rms follow simple (non-optimal) indexation rules. Gali and Gertler (1999)
assume that a fraction of rms set prices according to a rule of thumb (they
index their prices according to last-period ination) while the other rms
have rational expectations.
Some di¤erences between their Phillips curves and mine are due to a
di¤erence in frameworks. But even after adapting their models to MRs
framework (this involves setting the preference for the present to zero and
assuming that the real marginal cost is proportional to output) important
di¤erences remain. In the Rotemberg-Woodford model, when a rm sets its
price for a given date, it always perfectly anticipates the aggregate price-level
that will prevail at that date because all other rms will be setting their prices
for that date on the basis of the same common information set. This is not
the case in my hybrid model. An important di¤erence between my hybrid
model, on one hand, and the Gali-Gertler model or the model of Altig et al.
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(2005), on the other hand, is that their Phillips curves do not involve past
expectations whereas my hybrid model does (it inherits this feature from the
sticky-information model).
5 The ination impulse response in the strategic-
neutrality case
Strategic neutrality in price setting means that a rms desired price does
not depend on the prices set by competitors. After examining the relevance
of this assumption, I discuss the ination impulse response to three types
of unanticipated shocks: i) a transitory shock to the money-supply growth
rate or, equivalently, a permanent shock to the money-supply level (which
is experiment 1 in MR), ii) a permanent shock to the money-supply growth
rate (experiment 2 in MR), and iii) the intermediate case of a persistent but
not permanent shock to the money-supply growth rate.
5.1 Strategic neutrality
How can the desired price of a rm be independent of the prices set by
competitors? A rst answer would be that in the standard monopolistic-
competition model à la Dixit-Stiglitz, rms set their prices at a constant
markup over the marginal cost. Thus the prices of competitors do not directly
inuence the desired price. This answer, however, does not take into account
the possibility that the prices of competitors may indirectly inuence the
desired price, through their impact on marginal costs.
During the staggered price-setting process, a rm that adjusts its prices
is motivated by several incentives. First, it might want to adjust less than
what it would if all other rms had the opportunity to adjust, because it
faces competition from those rms that have not adjusted yet. This strate-
gic complementarity in price setting may hold even if rms simply choose a
markup that is a constant proportion of the marginal cost without taking
prices set by competitors directly into account. For example, assume there
is a reduction in money supply. Then a rm that adjusts its prices down-
ward, while some other rms have not yet done so, will face greater demand
than otherwise. If marginal productivity decreases with output (or if there
are some rm-specic factors), then marginal costs increase with output (as-
suming that the prices of production factors bought on the economy-wide
market stay constant), and, even if the rm faced no nominal rigidities, it
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would want to set its price higher than it would if other rms didnt face
nominal rigidities in order not to be overburdened by a overly high demand.
However, the price of production factors bought on the economy-wide
market need not stay constant. This can lead the rm to decrease its prices
by more than needed to reach the frictionless equilibrium (strategic substi-
tutability in price setting). Assuming that the real wage is pro-cyclical, it
will be lower during the transitory recession generated by the reduction in
money supply. This tends to decrease marginal cost and thus lead to lower
prices. If the complementarity and the substitutability incentives cancel each
other out, there is strategic neutrality in price setting: a rm would choose
to set its prices independently of the aggregate price level.
Whether there is complementarity or substitutability in price-setting is
a much debated issue in the literature. Using a dynamic stochastic general
equilibrium (DSGE) model with sticky prices, Chari et al. (2000) nd that
strategic substitutability arises from realistic deep-parameter values of their
model. On the other hand, Woodford (2003) argues that Chari and al. would
nd strategic complementarity in rms price decisions if they had taken
into account the existence of rm-specic production factors. Incorporating
sticky information into di¤erent DSGE models, Keen (2005) nds strategic
substitutability, whereas Trabandt (2006) nds strategic complementarity.
My reading of the current state of this debate is that it is not settled yet, and
that the middle ground of assuming strategic neutrality would be compatible
with the literature.
5.2 Permanent shocks to the money-supply level
Lets consider the case of a shock  to the level of money supply. Appendix
II shows that in this case, for t  0, the aggregate price level pt in the hybrid
model is given by:
pt = mt + 


    (1  )
t+2   
    (1  )
t+2

for  6=  (6.1)
pt = mt    (1  )t+1 [1 + (t+ 1)] for  =  .
Whereas, in the sticky-price and the sticky-information models, pt is re-
spectively given by:
pt;=1 = mt    (1  )t+1 for  = 1
pt;=1 = mt    (1  )t+1 for  = 1.
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Thus the pure sticky-price and the pure sticky-information cases yield the
same price dynamics if they are calibrated to get the same average duration
between two re-optimizations, that is, if the parameter  used in the sticky-
price case is the same as the parameter  used in the sticky-information
case.
If  6= , the price level in the hybrid case pt can be expressed as a linear
combination of the two pure casesprice levels:
pt =
(1 )pt;=1 (1 )pt;=1
  where the weights
(1 )
  and  (1 )  have
opposite signs (thus, it is a linear combination, but not a weighted average
although the sum is 1). Or equivalently: pt = pt;=1 + 
1 
  (pt;=1   pt;=1).
Equation (6.1) implies that the ination response for t  0 is given by:
t   g =

 t for t  0
0 for t < 0
, (6.2)
where g is the money-supply growth rate for t 6= 0.
The ination response after the shock is proportional to the probability
t given in equation (2.2) that a rm sets its rst informed price-adjustment
at t. Thus Figure 1 already shows the impulse response of ination for
di¤erent congurations of the parameters representing the degree of price
and information stickiness. This gure is reproduced below (a curve giving
the impulse response for  = 0:25 =  is added). As discussed in section
2, setting  and  equal to 0:4 yields the same average duration before the
rst informed adjustment as in the sticky-price model ( = 0:25 &  = 1)
or the sticky-information model ( = 1 &  = 0:25). On the other hand,
the hybrid model calibrated at  = 0:25 =  generates a greater degree of
nominal rigidity.
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Figure 2: Ination impulse response to a permanent shock to the
money-supply level
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With these parameter values, the sticky-information model yields the
same ination response as the sticky-price model. Moreover, after the initial
jump, it decreases monotonically, whereas the impulse response in the hybrid
model is hump-shaped. When for the hybrid model the probability of being
informed is the same as the probability of having the opportunity to reset
prices, and probabilities are calibrated as in MR to yield an average duration
of one year before an informed price-adjustment takes place, then the maxi-
mum occurs one quarter after the shock. If the overall nominal rigidities are
larger ( = 0:25 = ), then the maximum response of ination occurs later.
The intuition as to why ination is proportional to the probability of
setting a rst informed price-adjustment is easiest to understand if the level
of money supply is constant before the shock, is modied by the shock, and
remains at its new level after the shock. In this scenario, the price set after
the shock by an informed rm is at its long-term equilibrium. In this case
rms change their prices only once: they adjust to the long-term equilibrium
as soon as they can set their rst informed price-adjustments. Since all rms
had the same price before the shock and end up with the same new long-
term equilibrium, the ination response is proportional to the number of rst
informed price-adjustments.
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The impulse response of ination computed for the special case of a zero
money-supply growth rate remains the same for any other constant growth
rate. To see this, consider equation (II.2):
pt = (1  ) pt 1+2
1X
k=0
(1  )k
" 1X
j=0
h
(1  )j Et k ((1  ) pt+j + mt+j)
i#
.
If the money-supply dynamics are of the form eemt = eem 1+eeg (t+ 1), then
pt = mt in the absence of shocks. Therefore, equation (II.2) can be rewritten
replacing p by ep = p  eem and m by em = m  eem. Choosing eem 1 = m 1 andeeg = g, it follows that eemt = mnew;t (where mnew;t extends to all time the a¢ ne
relationship between t and m that holds after the shock), and thus emt = 0
after the shock.
If we know how to solve (II.2) for the price dynamics in the case where
money supply is constant after the shock, and want to know the price dynam-
ics when money supply grows at a constant rate after the shock, all we need to
do is subtract emt = mnew;t from the p and m variables to be in the setting in
which money supply is zero after the shock, solve for the dynamics of ep, and
add back mnew;t. Adding back mnew;t will change the aggregate price level
but not the di¤erence between ination with the shock and ination without
the shock (the constant eem 1 disappears when ination is computed, and the
term eeg disappears when the di¤erence between ination with and without
the shock is computed). The point is that, and this is true in the general case
since the argument is based on equation (II.2), the ination impulse response
is invariant to a transformation of the money-supply dynamics consisting in
adding a money-supply component with a constant growth rate.
Lets compute Et (t+1) for t = 0 in the simple case where the level
of money supply is 0 before the shock, is modied to  by the shock, and
remains at  after the shock. Firms unaware of the shock expect to keep
their prices constant even if they are allowed to reset them. Similarly, rms
aware of the shock, and having had the opportunity to make an informed
price adjustment, have fully adjusted already, and thus expect to keep their
prices constant even if they could reset prices in the future (expectations
are polled at a point in the period t = 0 when each rm knows if it can
reset its price at t = 0 or not). The only rms expecting to change their
own prices are those that are informed of the shock but havent had an
opportunity for an informed price adjustment. These rms, which at t = 0
are a proportion  (1  ) of all rms, expect to increase their own prices
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by an amount  if they have an opportunity to do so. Thus, E0 (1) =
 (1  ): the probability  (1  ) of being informed without having had
an opportunity for an informed price-adjustment times the probability  of
having an opportunity to adjust prices next period times the price change
. The average ination expectations can also be computed. Firms unaware
of the shock expect zero ination. Firms aware of the shock (whether they
had an opportunity to make an informed price adjustment or not), which
at t = 0 are a proportion  of all rms, know that ination at time t = 1
will be  1. Thus, the average next period ination expected at t = 0 is
1. From equation (2.2), 1 = 2
 
1  +
2

. Hence, the ratio at t = 0 of
average ination expectations to E0 (1) is 2
1 +
2
1  . This ratio is equal to
1 if  = 1 , i.e. in the pure sticky-price case. If  6= 1, this ratio is usually
di¤erent from 1 (the only other exception is when  = 1  ). This example
proves that the operator E can be di¤erent from the average expectations.
5.3 Permanent shocks to the money-supply growth rate
Lets continue to assume that rms are strategically neutral, but that at time
t = 0 there is a shock to the money-supply growth rate rather than to the
level of money supply. Equation (II.13) in Appendix II implies that in this
case the level of ination for t  0 is given by:
t = g + (g   gold)
2664
 t(1 )t+1
 
+
(1 )(1 )[(1 )t (1 )t]
( )2
  (1  )t+1
3775 for  6=  (6.3)
t = g + (g   gold) (1  )t

2
2
t (t+ 1)  (1  )

for  = .
Notice that (for t  0):
If  = 1 then t = g.
If  = 1 then t = g +
  (1  )t+1 +  (1  )t t (g   gold).
If  =  then t = g+
  (1  )t+1 + 2 (1  )t t (t+ 1) =2 (g   gold).
Figure 3 shows the impulse response to a money-supply growth shock,
using the same numerical example as for Figure 2.
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Figure 3: Ination impulse response to a permanent shock to the
money-supply growth rate
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These curves show the impulse response at time t as a proportion of the
long-run response. All curves converge toward 1 in the long run. For the
sticky-price case ( = 1) the ination response is at, whereas it is hump-
shaped for the sticky-information case (  = 1), reaching a maximum at
t = 1 

  1
ln(1 ) . The impulse response is also hump-shaped for the hybrid
case both when  =  = 0:25 and when  =  = 0:4. The two hybrid curves
are hump-shaped, but the maximum occurs later for the rst curve. There
is a jump in ination at time t = 0 for all four curves, but this jump is much
larger for the sticky-price curve than for the other curves. Overall, the two
hybrid curves have the same qualitative features as the sticky-information
curve, both contrasting sharply with the sticky-price curve. In contrast with
the case of a shock to the money-supply level, the sticky-information curve is
similar to the hybrid case here. The advantage of the hybrid curve relates to
micro evidence rather than macro evidence: in the sticky-information model
every rm changes its price every period (in contrast with micro evidence),
whereas this is not the case in the hybrid model.
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5.4 Persistent but not permanent shocks to the money-
supply growth rate
Lets consider another type of monetary shock. Suppose that
mold;t = m 1 + (t+ 1) gold for t < 0 ,
mt = m 1 + (t+ 1) gold + "0
tX
i=0
i for t  0 ,
where  is the autocorrelation of the money-supply growth rate. If  = 0,
then the shock is completely transitory, corresponding to the permanent
shock to the level of money supply discussed in section 5.2. If  = 1, then
the shock is permanent, corresponding to the permanent shock to the money-
supply growth rate discussed in section 5.3. Intermediate values of  corre-
spond to a persistent but not permanent shock to the money-supply growth
rate: the money-supply growth rate changes the most at t = 0, then changes
each period by a smaller amount and converges toward its initial value gold.
During this process, a change of the money-supply level of "0
1  builds up.
In considering this experiment, MR regard the value of  = 0:5 as being
realistic for U.S. quarterly data.
In the strategic-neutrality case, it is possible to nd a closed-form solution
for the aggregate price dynamics (see equation II.14 in appendix II). Figure
4 shows the impulse response of ination using the same numerical example
as for Figures 2 and 3.
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Figure 4: Ination impulse response to a shock to the
money-supply growth rate with autocorelation  = 0:5
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This gure shows that the ination impulse response is not hump-shaped
in the sticky-price model whereas it is hump-shaped in the sticky-information
model and in the hybrid model. The ination impulse responses of the sticky-
information and the hybrid models are still qualitatively similar. Section 5.2
has shown that decreasing the persistence of the shock ultimately favors the
hybrid model. For the intermediate case of  = 0:5, a small advantage for the
hybrid model can already be observed in the sense that the ination jump
at the shock is smaller and the hump appears later in the hybrid model (the
exact date at which the hump appears depends on the calibration).
6 Conclusion
Most macroeconomic models cannot explain the two following stylized facts
simultaneously: i) individual rms change prices every six months to a year
and ii) shocks to monetary policy have a delayed and gradual e¤ect on ina-
tion. This paper presents a hybrid sticky-price and sticky-information model
compatible with both of these facts.
In the case of a permanent shock to the growth rate of money supply, the
ination responses are hump-shaped both in the hybrid and in the sticky-
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information models, and both are clearly di¤erent from the monotonic re-
sponse of the sticky-price model. Reducing the persistence of the shock
ultimately favors the hybrid model. If the shock is completely transitory, the
hybrid model delivers a hump-shaped ination response to monetary policy,
whereas the two pure cases yield the same strictly decreasing response. In-
tuitively, this result relates to the hump-shaped dynamics of the number of
informed rms that have not yet had the opportunity to re-optimize their
prices since the shock occurred. In the intermediate case of a shock to the
money-supply growth rate with an autocorrelation coe¢ cient equal to 0.5,
the hybrid and the sticky-information models yield qualitatively similar in-
ation impulse responses.
On the way to computing ination impulse responses, I derive the Phillips
curve for the hybrid model (without, at this stage, assuming anything about
strategic neutrality). One novel feature of this Phillips curve is that it in-
volves a new kind of expectation operator.
This study could be extended by considering other kinds of monetary
shocks or deviation from strategic neutrality. It is not clear that in these
settings the hybrid model will be so distinctly superior to the pure models as
it is in the examples discussed here. A priori, it could be expected that the
hybrid model behaves more as an average of the pure models would in the
case of anticipated shocks. Whether this is the case or not could be checked.
The results of this paper have been obtained under the assumption of
strategic neutrality in the pricing decisions of rms. It would be impor-
tant to discuss the case of strategic complementarity since this may increase
persistence. Would strategic complementarity penalize the hybrid model rel-
ative to the sticky-information model? Strategic complementarity is likely to
make the sticky-information ination impulse-response more hump-shaped.
It would be interesting to know how the ination impulse response changes
according to the degree of strategic complementarity in the hybrid model.
Another issue is that strategic complementarity may allow the hybrid model
to remedy a shortcoming of the sticky-information model that has not yet
been discussed in this paper: in the sticky-information model, a monetary
shock would have no impact on ination once all rms are informed of the
shock.24 This would be obvious if information updating were assumed to oc-
cur at intervals of constant duration (then all rms would be informed after
that duration) rather than with a constant probability (in which case there
24Collard and Dellas (2003) and Dupor and Tsuruga (2005) criticize the sticky-
information model on this account.
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are always some rms that are not informed yet). But a hybrid of the stan-
dard sticky-price model and a sticky-information model in which information
is updated at constant intervals would become a sticky-price model as soon
as all rms are informed. Thus, the hybrid model may inherit the endoge-
nous persistence that, assuming strategic complementarity, the sticky-price
model features in most cases.25
Other interesting further research would include: i) discussing the case
in which the price-adjustment opportunity and information updating are not
independent or are state-dependent, and ii) extending the model to a general-
equilibrium setting.
25This phenomenon is best thought of as a "contract multiplier," as Taylor (1980) put
it. In the special case where perfect adjustment is immediate (this happens in the case
of a permanent shock to the money-supply growth rate), the contract multiplier cannot
generate additional persistence.
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Appendix I:
Derivation of the hybrid Phillips curve
Two intermediate equations
Lets rst derive two equations that will be useful later.
Equation (3.3) yields:
xt;k = Et k (pt ) + (1  )xt+1;k+1 (I.1)
because xt;k = 
1X
j=0
h
(1  )j Et k
 
pt+j
i
= Et k (pt )+
1X
j=1
h
(1  )j Et k
 
pt+j
i
= Et k (pt ) + (1  )
1X
j=0
h
(1  )j Et k
 
pt+1+j
i
= Et k (pt ) + (1  )xt+1;k+1.
Equation (3.4) yields:
pt = 
1X
k=0
h
(1  )k xt;k
i
+ (1  ) pt 1 (I.2)
because
pt = 
1X
j=0
"
(1  )j
1X
k=0
(1  )k xt j;k
#
= 
" 1X
k=0
(1  )k xt;k
#
+ 
1X
j=1
"
(1  )j
1X
k=0
(1  )k xt j;k
#
,
where

1X
j=1
"
(1  )j
1X
k=0
(1  )k xt j;k
#
= (1  )
1X
j=0
"
(1  )j
1X
k=0
(1  )k xt 1 j;k
#
= (1  ) pt 1
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Rewriting the hybrid Phillips curve
The hybrid Phillips curve t   Et (t+1) = 21  [yt + "t (pt )],
where Et (t+1) = 
"

1X
k=0
(1  )k xt+1;k+1   pt
#
and "t (pt ) = 
1X
k=1
(1  )k [Et k (pt )  pt ],
can be rewritten as:
t 
"

1X
k=0
(1  )k xt+1;k+1   pt
#
= 
2
1 
"
yt + 
1X
k=1
(1  )k [Et k (pt )  pt ]
#
,
which, using pt = pt+yt and t = pt pt 1, becomes after some algebraic
transformations:
pt   (1  ) pt 1   (1  ) 
1X
k=0
h
(1  )k xt+1;k+1
i
2
= 
1X
k=0
(1  )k Et k (pt + yt) .
(I.3)
Deriving the hybrid Phillips Curve
Equation (I.3) is true since
pt (1 )pt 1 (1 )
1X
k=0
[(1 )kxt+1;k+1]
2
=

1X
k=0
[(1 )kxt;k] (1 )
1X
k=0
[(1 )kxt+1;k+1]
2
using equation (I.2)
=

1X
k=0
[(1 )k[Et k(pt )+(1 )xt+1;k+1]] (1 )
1X
k=0
[(1 )kxt+1;k+1]
2
using equa-
tion (I.1)
= 
1X
k=0
h
(1  )k Et k (pt )
i
algebra
= 
1X
k=0
(1  )k Et k (pt + yt) using equation (3.1)
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Appendix II: The ination impulse response
This appendix gives some equations for computing the impulse responses
and explains why computation of the impulse response is easier in the pure
cases (sticky prices or sticky information) and in the strategic neutrality case
than in the general case.
II.1) The general case
Plugging equations (3.1), (3.2), (3.3), (4.2) and (4.3) into the hybrid
Phillips curve (4.1) yields:
(1  )
1X
k=0
(1  )k xt+1;k+1 (II.1)
  1  2 (1  ) pt + (1  ) pt 1
=  2
(
mt +
1X
k=1
(1  )k [Et k ((1  ) pt + mt)]
)
.
Plugging into equation (II.1) xt+1;k+1 expressed in terms of p and m ac-
cording to equation (3.3) yields:26
pt = (1  ) pt 1+2
1X
k=0
(1  )k
" 1X
j=0
h
(1  )j Et k ((1  ) pt+j + mt+j)
i#
.
(II.2)
In the general case this equation involves an innity of aggregate prices
(all aggregate prices from t   1 and thereafter). Some algebraic transfor-
mations can, however, reduce this dimensionality to a third-order recursive
equation with variable coe¢ cients. This equation is solvable (not necessarily
analytically, but at least numerically). The resolution of the general case is
left for further research. I will focus below on three special cases in which
computation is simple.
II.2) Three simple cases
Sticky information
In the sticky-information case,  = 1, and the future aggregate prices on
the right-hand side of equation (II.2) disappear (and so does the last-period
aggregate price), which yields a simple equation in pt:
26Alternatively, plug equations (3.1), (3.2) and (3.3) into equation (I.2) of appendix I.
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pt = 
1X
k=0
(1  )k [Et k ((1  ) pt + mt)] . (II.3)
This equation can be solved (assuming rational expectations) once the
nature of the monetary shock is specied.
In the absence of shocks, Et k (pt) = pt and Et k (mt) = mt, and equation
(II.3) yields pt = mt (whatever the dynamics of m).
If there is only a lone shock occurring at time t = 0, and if it is not
anticipated, then (II.3) becomes:
pt  mt
mold;t  mt =
(1  )t+1
+ (1  )t+1 (1  ) , (II.4)
wheremold;t is the actual money-supply before the shock, or the money supply
that would have prevailed after time t = 0 if no shock had occurred. mt still
denotes the actual money-supply (mt = mold;t for t < 0, but is di¤erent
from mold;t at t = 0, and may be di¤erent later on as well). Equation (II.4)
gives a measure of the incompleteness of the price adjustment made at time
t (as a proportion of the adjustment that would have been made at time
t in the absence of nominal rigidities). For t < 0, equation (II.4) yields
pt = mt. Ination can be computed by extracting pt from equation (II.4)
and substracting a lagged version of this equation.
Sticky prices
In the pure sticky-price model, equation (II.2) becomes (after plugging in
 = 1):
pt = (1  ) pt 1 + 2
1X
j=0
h
(1  )j Et ((1  ) pt+j + mt+j)
i
. (II.5)
The future aggregate price levels are still present, but they can be elimi-
nated easily by writing equation (II.5) for t+ 1, taking the expectation at t,
and substracting equation (II.5) for t divided by 1  . This yields:
Etpt+1  

2 +
2
1  

pt + pt 1 =   
2
1  mt. (II.6)
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This is a second-order recursive equation with constant coe¢ cients. There
are several ways to solve this equation analytically. For example, the dimen-
sionality can be further reduced to
pt = pt 1 + (1  )2
1X
i=0
iEtmt+i, (II.7)
where  is solution of 2+ 
2
1  = +
1

such that  < 1. The solution of (II.7)
is:
pt = (1  )2
1X
k=0
1X
i=0
i+kEt kmt k+i. (II.8)
Assuming that there is only a lone unanticipated shock occurring at time
t = 0, equation (II.8) could be expressed in terms of mold;t and mt. In the
sticky-price model it particularly makes sense to focus on cases in which
the growth rate of the money supply (without taking the logs) is constant
everywhere except when a shock occurs, because only in such cases would the
output gap be zero in the absence of shocks (or if the shock lies innitely far
in the past): in the absence of shocks, Et (pt+1) = pt+1 and equation (II.6)
becomes t+1 = 
2
1  (pt  mt), which yields pt = mt only if mt is an a¢ ne
function of time. Lets thus consider that money-supply dynamics is given
by mt = mold;t = m 1 + (t+ 1) gold until a shock occurs at t = 0 such that
mt = m 1 +  + (t+ 1) g for t  0. Then, the solution is:
pt = mt   t+1 for t  0 (II.9)
pt = mold;t for t < 0.
Thus, adjustment is perfect and immediate if  = 0 (even if there is a
change in the growth rate).
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Strategic neutrality
In the case of strategic neutrality ( = 1), equation (II.2) becomes:
pt = (1  ) pt 1 + 2
1X
k=0
(1  )k
" 1X
j=0
h
(1  )j Et k (mt+j)
i#
. (II.10)
All future aggregate prices have disappeared (as in the sticky-information
model), but the last-period aggregate price is still present: this is a rst-order
recursive equation with constant coe¢ cients that can be solved easily:
pt = 
2
1X
k=0
(1  )k
" 1X
l=0
1X
j=0
h
(1  )j+lEt l k (mt l+j)
i#
. (II.11)
Lets assume that there is only one shock, that it is not anticipated and
that it occurs at t = 0. As above, mold;t is the actual money-supply before
the shock or the money supply that would have prevailed after time t = 0 if
no shock had occurred. Then Et l k (mt l+j) = mold;t l+j except if t  k  l
and t+ j  l (that is, except if t+ j  l) in which case it is equal to mt l+j.
Then equation (II.11) becomes for t  0:
pt = 
2
8>>>><>>>>:
tX
k=0
(1  )k
" 1X
j=0
t kX
l=0
h
(1  )j+l (mt l+j  mold;t l+j)
i#
+
1X
k=0
(1  )k
" 1X
j=0
1X
l=0
h
(1  )j+lmold;t l+j
i#
9>>>>=>>>>; .
(II.12)
Under which conditions is the output gap zero in the absence of a shock?
As shown above, this is the case for the sticky-price model only if mone-
tary supply is an a¢ ne function of time. Since the strategic-neutrality case
overlaps with the sticky-price case, being an a¢ ne function of time is a nec-
essary condition for money-supply dynamics to yield a zero output gap in
the absence of a shock for every parameter value of the strategic-neutrality
case. That this necessary condition is also su¢ cient is most easily seen in
the Phillips curve (4.1) itself.
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 Permanent shock to the money-supply level and growth rate
Lets focus, as in the sticky-price model, on money-supply dynamics
given by mt = mold;t = m 1 + (t+ 1) gold until an unanticipated shock
occurs at t = 0 such that mt = mnew;t = m 1 +  + (t+ 1) g for t  0.
Then, for t  0, the solution is:27
pt =
mt + 
h

  (1  )t+2     (1  )t+2
i
+(g   gold)
"
(t+ 1) (1  )t+2 
 
+
(1 )(1 )[(1 )t+1 (1 )t+1]
( )2
#
for  6= 
(II.13)
pt = mt  

 (1  )t+1 [1 + (t+ 1)]
+ (g   gold) (t+ 1) (1  )t+1
 
1 + 
2
t
  for  = .
From this equation, ination could be computed. In particular, if the
monetary shock occurs only to the level of money supply (that is, g =
gold), then ination is simply given (for t  0) by t   g =  t, where
t is the probability that a rm sets its rst informed price-adjustment
t periods after the shock.
 Persistent but not permanent shocks to the money-supply
growth rate
Lets consider the following shock:
mold;t = m 1 + (t+ 1) gold for t < 0
mt = m 1 + (t+ 1) gold + "0
tX
i=0
i for t  0.
This implies that mt   gold =  (mt 1   gold) + "t , where "t = "0 if
t = 0 and zero otherwise.
Thus,  is the autocorrelation of the money-supply growth rate. If
 = 0, then the shock is completely transitory (or equivalently, it is a
permanent shock to the level of money supply). If  = 1, then this is
a permanent shock to the money-supply growth rate. Then, for t  0,
the solution is:
27If there is a mnew;t instead of a mt in (II.13), then this formula is also valid for t =  1
(with mnew;t= 1 = m 1 + ).
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a) for  6= 
pt = mt+
1
1 "0
8>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>:

  (1  )t+2     (1  )t+2
+t+1
+ 
1  1 

1
+ 1 

1
1  (1 )
266664
 (1  )t+2
+(1  ) t+1 (1  )t+2
  (1  ) t+1
+t+2 (1  )

1
  (1  )t+1

377775
9>>>>>>>>>=>>>>>>>>>;
.(II.14)
b) for  = 
pt = mt+"0
1
1  1 

1
1+(1 ) 1 

8><>:
 1 t+1
1   (1  )t+1
+ (1  )t+1

1 t+1
1    (t+ 1)


1 
+1 
2
(1  ) (1  )t+1 + (1  )t+1  (t+ 1)  t+1
9>=>;.
Here again, the ination dynamics can be computed.
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